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Buyer Status ·under the U.C.C.: A 
Suggested Temporal Definition 
David Frisch* 
J. INTRODUCTION 
The recognition of private property requires a comprehensive and 
systematic body of detailed rules to permit and control the transfer of 
property .1 Although these rules must necessarily comprehend innumerable 
transfer scenarios2 and force choices implicating difficult value judgments, 
at the most basic level two problems must be confronted: (1) how to 
accomplish a transfer of an item of property or an interest therein; and (2) 
how to resolve competing claims to the same item or interest. To deal with 
the former problem, one finds a history rich in rules clothed in ceremonial 
garb. The play is everything: a transfer occurs only if properly performed.3 
Assuming a transfer occurs, resolution of the latter problem often depends 
on a family of rules, all born from what can best be described as the first 
principle of Anglo-American property law: the transferee of property can 
receive no greater interest than that possessed by the transferor.4 This 
*Associate Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. J.D., 1975, University of Miami; 
L.L.M., 1980, Yale Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the summer 
research grant so generously provided by the Delaware Law School. 
1. Because not everyone is capable of producing the property they need or is capable of 
consuming fully the property they have, any property's enjoyment and value must rest, in 
part, on its transferability. One, therefore, finds that "[n]early all theories of private property 
assume that an owner ... has the power to transfer it. Indeed, it is hard to envision a general 
scheme of private property without transferability." Baird & Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, 
and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 299 n.4 (1984). 
2. Before being viewed as comprepensive, a set of transfer rules must, at a minimum, 
provide workable methods for effecting a voluntary transfer of property, both antemortem 
and postmortem, and to effect its involuntary transfer. A creditor with a claim against a debtor 
should somehow be able to "get at" the value of the debtor's interest in property as a means 
of satisfying that claim. 
3. The reasons for particular ceremonies are as varied as the ceremonies themselves. For 
example, an attempted gift of an item capable of delivery is invalid in the absence of its 
delivery; if actual delivery is impractical, then a symbolic or constructive delivery is necessary. 
See generally Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action 
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 341 (1926). One author has suggested that 
"[t]he survival of the dogma is doubtless due to the perfectly reasonable desire on the part of 
the courts to protect the property of the individual against ill-founded and fraudulent claims 
of gift .... " R. BROWN, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERlY § 7.2, at 78 (3d ed. 1975). On the other 
hand, consider the formalities that often precede the involuntary transfer of possession of 
property. Many of these formalities have their roots in the due process clauses of the 
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV§ 1. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 
(1972) (in absence of extraordinary situations, notice and hearing must precede issuance of 
writ of replevin). 
4. This principle has also been labeled the "derivation principle," see D. BAIRD & T. 
JACKSON, SECURllY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERlY 141 (1984), or, put in more eloquent terms: 
"Title, like a stream, cannot rise higher than its source." Barthelmess v. Cavalier, 2 Cal. App. 
2d 477, 487, 38 P.2d 484, 490 (1934). 
531 
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Article examines one facet of one exception to this first principle. 
It ha:; been trumpeted that "[t]he triumph of the good faith purchaser 
has been one of the most dramatic episodes in our legal history."5 With this 
victory came the correlative commercial doctrine of good faith purchase, a 
doctrine that allows for the chipping away of "security of ownership" in 
favor of "security of purchase."6 The doctrine makes it possible for the 
transferee of goods to receive under certain circumstances a property 
interest superior to that of the transferor.7 
It is not surprising that such a doctrine, antithetical as it is to 
traditional common-law theory, should have experienced difficulty estab-
lishing roots in the common law.8 Not until the early part of the nineteenth 
century and the sporadic passage of the nonuniform Factor's Acts was there 
any show of support for the notion of a good faith purchase doctrine.9 
Softening of the judicial bias in favor of ownership interests soon followed, 
but was limited to situations in which the transferor had somehow acquired 
voidable title from the true owner. Voidable title would ripen into good title 
when the item was later acquired by a good faith purchaser.10 With the 
eventual codification of sales law, the good faith purchase doctrine found a 
5. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954). 
6. For a discussion of this conflict, see generally Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyanc-
ing Principles 1znd Property Interests, 59 B. U .L. REV. 811 (1979); Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase 
Ideci and the Uniform Commercial Cade: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605 
(1931); Gilmore, supra note 5; Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, 
Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REv. 697 (1962); Warren, Cutting Off Claims of 
Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 469 (1963); Weinberg, Markets 
Overt, Vo1dabl1 Titles, and Feckless Agents: judges and Efficiency in the Antebellum Doctrine of Good 
Faith Purchast, 56 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1981). 
When the transferor's title is imperfect because it is subject to an outstanding interest, the 
tension betm·en security of ownership and security of purchase is readily apparent. To limit 
the transferee's title to that of the transferor keeps alive the outstanding interest and secures 
its ownership Conversely, to secure the purchase, a rule is needed that permits the transferee 
to take free of the interest, resulting in its termination. Whichever approach is taken, someone 
loses. 
7. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-307. Although the scope of this Article is limited to transactions in 
goods, the good faith purchase doctrine is not. See generally Gilmore, supra note 5. 
8. See Gilmore, supra note 5, at 1057. Returning to the beginning of the story, "[t]he initial 
common law 'Position was that equities of ownership are to be protected at all costs: an owner 
may never be· deprived of his property rights without his consent." Id. The first exception 
carved into this maxim was the English doctrine of "market overt." As early as the sixteenth 
century, purchasers of goods would take free of all third party claims provided that the 
purchase was made in an open fair or market. See generally 2 ·w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*449-55; Pease, The Change of tlze Property in Goods by Sale in Market Ovl!1t, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 375 
(1908); Weinberg, supra note 6. American jurisdictions frequently considered but always 
rejected this ·~xception to the common law's veneration of existing property interests. See 
Hawkland, su/rra note 6, at 698-700; Warren, supra note 6, at 470; Weinberg, supra note 6, at 
5-15. 
9. See Gilmore, supra note 5, at 1057-58. ("[A]nyone buying from a factor in good faith, 
relying on his possession of the goods, and without notice of limitations on his authority, took 
good title against the true owner."). 
IO. See id. ,1t 1059-62. The transferor would acquire voidable title and hence the power to 
transfer good title in those cases in which the true owner, although defrauded, had 
nevertheless intended to part with title to the goods. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 17. 
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home in the Uniform Sales Act11 and. now tesides in the Uniform 
Commercial Code (the Code or U.C.C.). 12 
Sparsed throt].ghout the Code one finds several characters with 
different names, but all entitled under appropriate circumstances to good 
faith purchase treatment. 13 The primary focus of this Article is on "one of 
the favorites in the dramatis personae of the UCC"14: the buyer in ordinary 
course of business. In particular, the Article asks when during the life of a 
sales transaction will a purchaser qualify as a protected buyer? On this 
temporal issue, as well as on others, the Code is conspicuously silent.15 
This Article attempts two different but complementary tasks. First, it 
offers an answer to the "by no means academic question"16 asked above. In 
so doing, the Article considers Code rules that affect the buyer-seller 
relationship and those that impact on the interests of third parties. The 
conclusion reached is that buyer status occurs at the moment the purchaser 
obtains the remedial right to the goods vis-a-vis the seller.17 In most 
11. The sections of the UNIFORM SALES Acr, 1 U.L.A. 1 (1950) (act withdrawn 1962) relevant 
to this discussion are: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who is not 
the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the 
consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller 
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the 
seller's authority to sell. 
Id. § 23, 1 U.L.A. at 379. 
Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been 
avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided 
he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect of title. 
Id. § 24, 1 U.L.A. at 387. 
Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the goods, or of 
negotiable documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or 
by an agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge, 
or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying value for the same 
in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if 
the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorized by the owner of 
the goods to make the same. 
Id. § 25, 1 U.L.A. at 390. 
12. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations to "the Code" or "U.C.C." in this 
Article are to the text and comments of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE (1978) (official text with 
comments). 
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403 (2) (buyer in ordinary course); 3-302 (holder in due course); 
7-501 (holder to whom negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated); 8-302 (bona 
fide purchaser). These characters and others receive their favorable treatment in U.C.C. §§ 
2-403(1), 2-403(2), 2-702(3), 2-706(5), 3-119(1), 3-207(2), 3-305, 3-406, 3-407, 3-602, 5-114(2), 
6-110(2), 7-205, 7-208, 7-209(3), 7-210(5), 7-308(4), 7-502(1), 7-503(3), 7-504(2)-(3), 8-205, 
8-206(1), 8-302(3), 8-311, 9-301(1), 9-306(2), 9-307(1)-(2), 9-308, 9-309, 9-504(4). 
14. Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary Caurse of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(and Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1, 2. 
15. Others have struggled with the issue of "when" in other contexts. See, e.g., Anzivino, 
When Does a Debtor Have Rights in the Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 
61 MARQ. L. REv. 23 (1977); Carlson & Shupack,]udicial Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: Part 1, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 287, 299-317 (1984) (discussing when 
person becomes lien creditor for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-301(1)). 
16. Skilton, supra note 14, at 15; see also Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer 
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 264, 487 A.2d 953, 957 (1985) ("The point at which a person 
becomes a buyer in ordinary course is subji:ct to considerable controversy because the Code 
does not specify the moment at which the status is conferred."). 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 242-62. 
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instances, therefore, buyer status will inevitably coincide with the moment 
the remedy of specific performance or, in some cases, replevin becomes 
available to the buyer. The Article's second purpose is descriptive. It looks 
behind the rhetoric of the buyer status cases to see how their resolution 
compares, in fact, with those cases in which the only issue is the buyer's 
right to obtain possession of the goods from the seller. It then considers 
whether harmonization of these two lines of cases is possible.1s 
II. THE NEED FOR A TEMPORAL DEFINITION 
Section 1-201(9) of the Code is the definitional source of buyer in 
ordinary course of business: 
[A] person who in good faith and without knowledge that the 
sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security 
interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from 
a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not 
include a pawnbroker. All persons who sell minerals or the like 
(including oil and gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be deemed 
to be persons in the business of selling goods of that a kind. 
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on 
securc::d or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or 
documents or title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does 
not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial 
satisfaction of a money debt. 19 
This definition and its location within the Code suggest two questions, the 
answers to which bear directly on the scope of this Article. 
If one assumes that the purchase, prior to its interruption, was 
proceeding "in good faith" and "in ordinary course from a person in the 
business of selling goods of that kind," then the only task remaining is to 
determine if buyer status has been reached. Yet the buyer in ordinary 
course is not the Code's only buyer of goods who is privileged by receiving 
good faith purchase treatment. Sometimes the privileged buyer is simply 
the good faith purchaser.2° Here the Code's nomenclature must be used 
with care. Sections 1-201(32) and (33) define "purchaser" as a person who 
obtains an interest in property as the result of any "voluntary transac-
tion."21 Thus, the term includes and encompasses characters in addition to 
the usual buyer. When, howeve.r, the person claiming to be a purchaser is 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 263-73. 
19. u.c.c. § 1-201(9). 
20. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1). This is, perhaps, the Code's most notorious purchaser 
prO\•ision. The subsection begins by sheltering the purchaser's title, giving the purchaser "all 
title which his transferor had or had power to transfer ... . "Id. But the purchaser's title is not 
nec.;:ssarily limited to that of its transferor. By using the term "power to transfer" the 
sub~ection "ccntinue[s] unimpaired all rights acquired under the law of agency or of apparent 
agency or ownership or other estoppel, whether based on statutory provisions or on case law 
principles." U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 1. Finally it concludes by recognizing the "voidable title" 
doccrine, see st!pra note 10 and accompanying text, providing "specifically for the protection of 
the good faith purchaser for value in a number of specific situations which have been 
troublesome under prior law." U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 1. 
21. u.c.c. § 1-201(32)-(33). 
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also a buyer, should the formula for determining buyer in ordinary course 
status be used even though the purchase is not in the ordinary course? 
Although particular statutory language may make consistent harmoniza-
tion difficult,22 the test should be the same absent a clear statutory or 
policy-mandated push in a different direction.23 
Because the question of buyer in ordinary course status is made 
relevant by several Code sections,24 one must similarly ask whether the 
determination of that status should vary with the particular section. It 
would appear that by placing the definition in Article I, the drafters 
intended for uniform construction of the term "buyer in the ordinary 
course."25 Moreover, no reason appears for defining the same status 
differently when it has the same effect of cutting off third party property 
interests.26 This conclusion does not, however, preclude imposing require-
ments in addition to buyer in ordinary course status as a requisite to 
favorable treatment when special or different policy considerations are 
involved.27 Section 7-205, for example, refers to "[a] buyer in the ordinary 
22. For example, U.C.C. § 2-403(1) speaks in terms of "title" but the various buyer in 
ordinary course provisions do not. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) (buyer receives "rights" of 
entruster); 9-307(1) (buyer takes "free" of security interest). For the full text of both 
subsections, see infra note 24. On this basis, an argument can be fashioned that for a buyer to 
achieve purchaser status under§ 2-403(1), title must pass, whereas buyer status under other 
provisions is not necessarily dependant upon the location of title. The temptation of the 
approach is rejected in Leary & Sperling, The Outer limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. R£v. 50, 
81-83 (1981). 
23. See infra note 262. 
24. A determination of this status is most frequently required under U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) 
and 9-307(1). The former provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who 
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in 
ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2). The latter provides: 
A l:iuyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other than a 
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free 
of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected 
and even though the buyer knows of its existence. 
u.c.c. § 9-307(1). 
25. Absent different or additional definitions elsewhere in the Code, the title and preamble 
to U.C.C. § 1-201 make it clear that, "unless the context otherwise requires," § 1-201 
definitions are to apply throughout the Code. The definition of "buyer in the ordinary course" 
would be particularly inappropriate for "otherwise" treatment because the drafters would have 
provided, but did not, alternative definitions of the term when making it relevant to the 
operation of different Code sections. 
26. It is true that the degree of sympathy one feels for the party whose interest is being 
divested will often be greater under U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (unsophisticated consumer entruster) 
than under U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (sophisticated commercial lender). Although this difference may 
initially have called for a different statutory response, it does not call for dissimilar 
construction of identical statutory language. As one commentator aptly put it: "[T]here is 
much to be said for the proposition that the question whether a person is a buyer in ordinary 
course of business should be answered irrespective of its setting under section 2-403(2) or 
9-307(1)." Skilton, supra note 14, at 38. For a case reflecting this attitude, see Big Knob 
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 264-68, 487 A.2d 953, 
957-59 (1985) (cases and commentary involving buyer status under § 9-307(1) referred to 
without distinction to support finding of buyer status under § 2-403(2)). 
27. One other point of potential variance between§ 2-403(2) and other buyer in ordinary 
course provisions should be mentioned. To qualify as a buyer in ordinary course one must act 
in "good faith," a term the Code defines as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). The Code further refines this definition by requiring of a 
merchant not only honesty in fact but also "the observance of reasonable commercial 
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course of business of fungible goods sold and delivered by a warehouseman 
.... "28 Because this section implicates policies not at work in other sections, 
a delivery requirement exists.29 This added requirement should not he 
confused with buyer status, the timing of which is the same as under other 
sections, but should be seen as an additional requirement to that status.30 
As the preceding discussion has shown, the question of whether one 
has qualified as a buyer can manifest itself when any one of several Code 
sections is applicable, including those that protect the interests of good faith 
purchasers.31 The context in which most courts have been forced to answer 
this question, however, has been in the application of U.C.C. section 
9-307(1).3:! Therefore, it seems fitting to use that section to illustrate the 
scope and importance of the problem. 
Section 9-307(1) is but one of the Code's numerous exceptions to the 
presumptive effectiveness of a security interest.33 The section provides that 
standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b). Because the Article 2 refinement 
of good faith expressly applies only to that article, see U.C.C. § 2-103(1), one must ask whether 
a merchant buyer claiming ordinary course status under a section in another Code article is 
held to a lower standard of good faith. On this point it should come as no surprise that the 
courts are not in accord. Compare Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 
743, 751 (3d Cir. 1979) (§ 2-103(l)(b) does not apply to Article 9 cases) and General Elec. 
Credit Corp. v. Humble, 532 F. Supp. 703, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (same) and Sherrock v. 
Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 651 (Del. 1972) ("We find no basis anywhere for the 
conclusion that the drafters of the Code intended to make it permissible to 'cross over' to 
Article 2 for the definition of the term 'good faith' as incorporated by reference in Article 9.") 
aiul Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Helland, 105 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653, 434 N.E.2d 295, 297-98 
(1982) (rejecting argument that Article 2 good faith definition applies in Article 9 transaction) 
with Swift v. J.I. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (objective standard 
of U.C.C. § ~!-103(l)(b) applicable for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-307(1)). 
28. u.c.c:. § 7-205. 
29. As Professors Leary and Sperling explained, 
[a] different policy from that of U.C.C. § 9-307(1) may be at work where stored 
fungible goods are concerned, as U.C.C. § 7-207(1) permits commingling, and, in the 
case of an "overissue," a loss is shared by all of the owners in common of the 
commini~led mass. When there has been a delivery to a BIOCOB [buyer in ordinary 
course of business] out of the commingled mass, thus causing an "overissue" ... will 
there be'a need to pro-rate a remainder among the holders of warehouse receipts. If 
there has been no delivery to the BIOCOB, U.C.C. §§ 7-205 and 7-207(2) indicate 
that the risk of the warehouseman's 'l\Tongdoing must be borne by the potential 
BIOCOB of the goods .... 
Leary & Sperling, supra note 22, at 79-80 n.67. 
30. Wher.~ there is, as in the case of U.C.C. § 7-205, a delivery requirement, the question 
of when buy.~r status is achieved largely disappears. Because delivery will usually signal the 
completion of the seller's transfer obligation and the removal of the goods from the seller's 
po~session, it would be implausible, at that point, to maintain that buyer status is lacking. 
31. Whether the course of buying has progressed to such a degree that the buyer's interest 
should be protected from those with claims against the seller is an issue that also transcends the 
Code. For example, an essentially non-Code dispute involving the same question could occur 
between a bLfer and a judicial lien creditor of the seller. 
32. For llhat is probably the best and most complete discussion to date of U.C.C. § 
9-307(1), see generally Skilton, supra note 14. It should be emphasized that although § 
9·307(1) is tte section that most frequently necessitates a determination of buyer status, it is 
not the only section. See, e.g., Schneider v.J.W. Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 333 (Colo. 
191!6) (deciding buyer status under§ 2-403(2)); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer 
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 267-68, 437 A.2d 953, 958-59 (1935) (same). 
33. Section 9-201 provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security 
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the 
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"[a] buyer in the ordinary course of business ... takes free of a security 
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected 
and even though the buyer knows ofits existence."34 When section 9-307(1) 
applies, the original security interest "dies,"35 a new security interest in 
identifiable proceeds received by the debtor is born, 36 and the buyer goes 
merrily along. Because the value of the security interest in the proceeds will 
usually equal or exceed that of the original collateral, the secured party 
should, theoretically, have no reason to complain about the Code's partic-
ular allocation of interests. The secured party's contentment, however, 
presupposes two conditions. The first is that the proceeds remain identifi-
able37 and available. 38 Second, that, excluding the value of the goods that 
were the subject of the transaction between the seller and the buyer, the 
secured party is fully secured at the time it elects to exercise its rights upon 
the seller's default.39 
Consider, for example, the much commented upon conflict between 
the Code's second class citizen,40 the prepaying buyer, and the secured 
creditor.41 For whatever reason, and many are possible, the buyer makes 
the decision to pay part or all of the purchase price without taking delivery 
of the goods.42 If the goods are still in the seller's possession when the 
collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Thus, unless some exception exists a secured 
creditor prevails against all other parties. Unfortunately for the secured creditor, the Code 
provides a host of exceptions scattered throughout Part 3 of Article 9. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 
9-307, 9-308, 9-309, 9-310, 9-312, 9-313, 9-314, 9-315. Moreover, "despite 9-20l's bold 
assertion that only other provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code override it, obviously 
other statutory law (such as the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code) must be 
considered." D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 367-68. 
34. u.c.c. § 9-307(1). 
35. For an intriguing attempt to distinguish between a security interest's death and its 
subordination in Article 9, see generally Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 547 (1984). 
36. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). 
37. The question whether proceeds are identifiable may arise in a multitude of contexts but 
is most frequently encountered when cash proceeds are in some way commingled with funds 
from other sources. See generally Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 120. 
38. Irrespective of the particular controls placed on the debtor's activities by the secured 
party, the risk of debtor misbehavior is always present. For an explanation of secured credit 
premised on this observation, see Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among 
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1149-58 (1979). 
39. If the disposition value of all collateral within the seller's possession is insufficient to 
satisfy fully the seller's obligation, the secured party will have the incentive to increase that 
value by also laying claim to collateral previously transferred to third parties. 
40. This characterization is borrowed from Gordon, The Prepaying Buyer: Second Class 
Citizenship Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 565, 565 (1968). 
41. See generally id.; Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buj·er, 85 YALE L.J. 1 
(1975); Speidel, Advance Payments in Contracts for Sale of Manufactured Goods: A U:Jok at the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 281 (1964). 
42. See, e.g., Thompson v. McMaster, (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.), 16 Bankr. 417, 418 (N.D. 
Tex. 1982) (good not yet completed by seller); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. 
Associates Fin. Servs., 133 Ga. App. 488, 491, 211 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1974) (tractor truck held 
by seller pending buyer's acquisition-"Of trailers); Farmers State Bank v. Webel, 113 Ill. App. 
3d 87, 89-90, 446 N.E.2d 525, 527 (1983) (pigs left with seller for care and finishing); Integrity 
Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. 
Ct. 1977) (mobile home left with seller pending buyer's acquisition of lot); Chrysler Credit 
Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 263, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (good held by 
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secured party acquires the right and makes the decision to proceed against 
its collateral, the secured party will, if undersecured, assert a security 
interest in both the goods and their proceeds. If the secured party is 
successful, the buyer loses any claim to the goods, suffers an immediate 
out-of-pocket loss in the amount of the prepayment, and leaves the deal 
with a damages claim of probably negligible value against the seller. On the 
other hand, if the buyer's interest is protected by section 9-307(1), the buyer 
receives the goods and the secured party loses a windfall for which it never 
bargained.43 Moreover, the right to the goods is not the only right at stake. 
If the buyer takes free of the security interest, the secured party faces the 
risk of a conversion claim if the secured party acts as though the security 
interest still exists.44 Thus, the buyer's status at the time the secured party 
proceeds against the collateral is crucial to the outcome of this type of case. 
Other potential scenarios requiring an inquiry into buyer status under 
section 9-lW7(1) status deserve brief mention. In these, the section's role is 
not to resolve a dispute between the secured party and the buyer but rather 
to settle a dispute between competing secured parties.45 
One scenario involves the competing claims of the seller's inventory 
secured party (SP) and a purchaser of chattel paper.46 Suppose that the sale 
to the buyer is financed initially by the seller, who receives from the buyer 
a signed promissory note and a security interest in the goods to secure 
payment of the note. This newly acquired chattel paper is then transferred 
by the seller to someone other than SP. If, while the goods are still in the 
seller's possession, either the seller or the buyer defaults on its secured 
obligation, a question of priority ofliens is likely to arise between SP and the 
chattel paper purchaser. SP will base its claim to the goods on the security 
interest received directly from the seller, whereas the purchaser of the 
chattel paper will claim priority on the basis of the security interest received 
indirectly from the buyer.47 Although section 9-308 sorts out the two 
seller pending buyer's receipt of ta.'t refund to be used for downpayment); Holstein v. 
Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 213, 404A.2d 842, 843 (1979) (seller agreed to store 
boat for winter). Further examples of why a seller might retain possession are set forth in 
Gordon, supra note 40, at 566 n.4. 
43. The term "windfall" seems appropriate because it is unlikely that the secured party's 
expectations at the time the secured transaction was entered into encompassed a claim both to 
an item of collateral and to its proceeds. This sentiment surfaced in Herman v. First Farmers 
State Bank, '73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979), in which the court thought such a 
result "would inequitably allow the inventory financer a double recovery." Id. at 481, 392 
N.E.2d at 347. 
44. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'! Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 
1979); Chryder Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 268-69, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 532-33 
(Sup. Ct. 1908); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 145-47 (R.I. 1983). 
45. See SH!ton, supra note 14, at 76. Professor Skilton refers to third party rights that are 
dependent on the buyer's status as "satellite rights." Id. 
46. Chattd paper is "a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and 
a security interest in or a lease of specific goods .... " U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b). 
47. The regularity of this type of dispute can, without reference to reported cases, be 
confirmed by the court's statement in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 263, 
288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 528 (Sup. Ct. 1968) that "[s]ituations such as this are, moreover, 
commonplace, according to counsel, in insolvent automobile dealerships and with major 
appliance dealers." Id. at 263, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 528. For cases involving this issue, see, e.g., Rex 
Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 176-77, 580 P.2d8, 8-9 (Ct.App. 1978); Wickes 
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parties' relative rights to the chattel paper, it says nothing about rights to 
the underlying goods.48 If the course of the sale has reached the point at 
which the buyer qualifies under section 9-307(1), then a priority rule is not 
needed because conflicting security interests do not exist; SP no longer has 
an interest in the goods and the chattel paper purchaser must necessarily 
prevail.49 If, however, the buyer has not yet qualified for protection under 
section 9-307(1), then, assuming no other section causes the death of SP's 
interest,so SP's interest should have priority.s1 
A similar but conceptually distinct scenario emerges with only a slight 
change of players. Instead of a buyer who purchases on credit, assume that 
there is a buyer who pays cash that is provided by a third party lender 
(Lender). To secure the loan, Lender receives from the buyer a security 
interest in the goods. If either SP or Lender attempts to enforce its security 
Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 363 So. 2d 56, 57-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Assocs. Fin. Servs., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492-94, 211 
S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974). 
48. But see Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. C.l.T. Corp., 679 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1984) (priority under§ 9-308 gives purchaser of chattel paper priority as to good). 
49. Oddly enough, U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) provides that the chattel paper purchaser's 
repossession will cause SP's lien to reattach. Priority to the good will then depend on who has 
priority to the chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b). If, however, SP wrongfully repossesses 
following its loss of lien, the lien should not reattach. This distinction, unfortunately, was 
overlooked in International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Assocs. Fin. Servs., 133 Ga. App. 488, 
492, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1974), and in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 
269-70, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533-34 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
50. The secured party must also be concerned with U.C.C. § 9-306(2). This subsection 
terminates a security interest if the collateral's "disposition was authorized by the secured party 
in the security agreement or otherwise .... "U.C.C. § 9-306(2). Because buyer in ordinary 
course status under § 1-201 (9) requires a buyer to buy "from a person in the business of selling 
goods of that kind," U.C.C. § 9-307(1) will apply primarily to inventory. This requirement 
would suggest that most sales by the seller are "authorized" under § 9-306(2), with the b'uyer 
taking free of the security interest without regard to U.C.C. § 9-307(1). This does not mean, 
however, that the issue of when buyer status attaches loses its relevance. It would be 
anomalous to conclude that a disposition has occurred for purposes ofU.C.C. § 9-306(2) prior 
to the time buyer status is achieved for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See infra note 262. 
Moreover, the initial authorization of the seller's disposition is often conditional upon delivery 
of proceeds to the secured party. When a delivery fails to take place, courts frequently deny 
protection under U.C:C. § 9-306(2), thus forcing reliance on U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See, e.g., 
Northwest Livestock Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 31 
Bankr. 670, 673 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (failure to deliver proceeds to secured party vitiates 
consent); North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 696, 
577 P.2d 35, 41 (1978) (failure to pay proceeds jointly to debtor and secured party vitiates 
consent); Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789, 794, 212 
N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (1978) (debtor's default vitiates consent); Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v. 
Long Creek Meat Co., 266 Or. 643, 651, 513 P.2d 1129, 1133 (1973) (nonpayment of buyer's 
draft vitiates consent). 
51. Section 9-306(5)(c) would, in this case, have no role to play because SP's lien did not 
reattach. Although it appears that U.C.C. § 9-312(5) is the appropriate priority rule to resolve 
this dispute, at least one commentator has suggested that the first-to-file rule was never meant 
to apply when, as here, two debtors are involved and that priority should in all cases be 
awarded to SP. See B. CLARK, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.8(4), at 3-53, 3-54 (1980). Not all courts, however, have accepted this 
limitation on the scope ofU.C.C. § 9-312(5). See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. First Nat'! 
Bank and Trust Co., 446 P.2d 277, 282 (Okla. 1968). 
' 
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interest before the goods leave the seller's possession and control,52 a 
ranking of their respective claims will often be necessary.53 As before, the 
issue of who has the senior lien or, for that matter, whether there are in fact 
competing· claims to the goods will depend on the buyer's status at the time 
either party proceeds against the goods. Lender's interest should be 
subordinate to that of SP, unless the latter's interest has ceased to exist.54 
This, in tum, depends on whether the buyer has become a buyer for 
purposes of section 9-307(1). 
JII. TEMPORAL DEFINITIONS AND THE COURTS 
Having briefly outlined the typical contexts in which the need to 
determine buyer status is likely to arise, it will be helpful to take a critical 
look at how courts have decided buyer in ordinary cour.>e cases. What 
results from this venture is, unfortunately, a vision of commercial law that 
is unclear, uncertain, and that totally lacks a persuasive doctrinal founda-
tion. To simplify discussion, consider the commonly accepted alternatives 
for pinpointing the moment at which buyer status is achieved. They are (1) 
the date of contract formation; (2) the date the goods are identified to the 
contract;(:~) the date title to the goods passes to the buyer; and (4) the date 
the buyer obtains possession of the goods.55 Note that these events are set 
forth chronologically, mirroring the usual course of the transaction of a 
sale. Note also that what results is a definitional spectrum running from 
security of purchase to security of ownership. 
A. The Possession Date 
At one end of the spectrum lies a rule requiring the buyer to take 
possession of the goods in order to attain buyer status under the Code.56 
52. Although the problem is beyond the scope of this Article, the statement in the text 
assumes that at some point prior to the repossession the buyer had whatever quantum of 
intC'rest is needed in the goods to constitute "rights in the collateral" so that Lender's security 
interest was able to attach. See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c). Not articulated in those cases involving a 
purchaser of chattel paper, see supra text accompanying notes 46-51, but nevertheless implicit 
in their holdings is the conclusion that that interest is not dependent upon the buyer's 
pos!.ession. This view, however, has not been universally accepted. See Anzivino, supra note 15, 
at 44-45 (sufficient "rights in the collateral'' hinges on buyer's possession) see also infra te.xt 
accompanyin1~ notes 155-60, 201-06. 
53. See, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 
377 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Hamilton County Bank v. Tuten, 250 So. 2d 17, 18-19 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1971); Crystal State Bank v. Columbia Heights State Bank, 295 Minn. 181, 182, 203 
N.'W.2d 389, 390 (1973). 
54. See supra note 49. Because a chattel paper purchaser is not involved in this scenario, if 
SP'& lien was lost it cannot be regained under U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a). 
55. See Skilton, supra note 14, at 16; Note, The Buyer-Secured Party Conflict and Section 
9-307(1) of th.1 U.C.C.: ldenti!Jing When a Buyer Qualifies for Protection as a BuJer in Ordinary 
Course, 50 FmDHAM L. REv. 657, 662 (1982) [hereinafter Note, BuJer-Secured Party Conflict]; 
Note, Wltm D11es a Bu'Jer Become a Bu'Jerin Ordinary Course? U.C.C. §§ 1-201($1, 9-307(1): A Test 
and a Proposal, 60 NEB. L. REV. 848, 852 (1981) [hereinafter Note, A Test and a Proposal]. 
56. A poliry justification for mandating possession by the buyer is based on the perceived 
evih engendered by the seller's continued possession of goods now sut~ecr. to an interest of 
whkh no public notice is given. See infra text accompanying notes 171-207. Because possession 
is at the root of the problem, discussion often centers on a buyer's need to gain possession 
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This rule is weighted heavily in favor of ownership interests. The chrono-
logical moment when the buyer's status becomes relevant is always when 
progress of the transaction is terminally interrupted.57 Because, in the 
typical case, the cause of the interruption is a repossession by the secured 
party while the goods are still in the seller's possession, buyer status would 
be invariably denied. If a consensus of judicial opinion exists in this area, 
the consensus arguably is that a buyer need not take possession to qualify 
as a buyer in the ordinary course of business;58 this conclusion is implicit in 
some cases,59 explicit in others.60 
Despite the initial perception of a clear judicial rejection of this end of 
the definitional spectrum, there is one case that justifies a rethinking of this 
commonly held assumption. In Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc.,61 the court 
seemed to reject absolutely the notion that buyer status depends on 
possession, 62 but immediately retreated from this position in the very next 
paragraph of the opinion: 
While the Commercial Code ... does not require that in all 
cases the buyer actually take delivery in order to have a buyer in 
ordinary course of business status, sound policy considerations in 
rather than on a seller's need to lose possession. Id. The latter situation, however, does not 
depend upon the former. If, for example, the goods are to be shipped by the seller, loss of 
possession will usually occur upon tender of delivery, see U.C.C. §§ 2-503(2), 2-504, yet the 
buyer will not have gained possession until the goods are received. See U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(c). 
Although the terms "delivery" and "possession" are not synonymous, see Mechanics Nat'! Bank 
v. Goucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 148, 385 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (1979); Integrity Ins. Co, v. 
Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 858, 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977), 
they are often treated as such. Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 673 
("Although the concepts thus are not synonymous, they are often used interchangeably."). 
Absent a reason for distinguishing between "possession" and "delivery," this Article will use 
the term "possession" expansively to include a tender of delivery where the seller has lost 
possession. 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 40-54. 
58. See Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 673 ("Courts and commentators 
routinely reject imposition of a delivery or receipt requirement ••.. "); Note, U.C.C. Section 
9-307(1) and the Non-Possessory Buyer: Is the Good Faith Purchaser Always Right?, 19 GA. L. REv. 
123, 139 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Is the Good Faith Purchaser Always Right?] ("The courts 
uniformly conclude that .•• one need not take possession of goods to be a buyer •.•• "); Note, 
A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 875 ("One area of judicial agreement ... is that delivery 
and thus possession are unnecessary .... "). 
59. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 650-51 (Del. 1972) 
(without discussion of when buyer status attaches, court permitted buyers to take free of 
security interest because it was not act of bad faith to leave goods with seller); Tanbro Fabrics 
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 637, 350 N.E.2d 590, 592-93, 385 N.Y.S.2d 
260, 262 (1976) (without discussion of when buyer status attaches, court permitted buyer to 
take free of security interest even though goods in possession of secured party). 
60. See, e.g., Thompson v. McMaster (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.), 16 Bankr. 417, 420 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1982); Rex: Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, 10 (Ct. 
App. 1978); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478, 392 N.E.2d 344, 
345-46 (1979); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 871, 396 
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 148 (R.I. 
1983). 
61. 59 WIS. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973). 
62. The Adamatic coun first said: "It seems clear that, if there is a sale and the buyer has 
obtained title to the goods, his status as a buyer in ordinary course will not be defeated merely 
because he has not taken possession." Id. at 239, 208 N.W.2d at 107. 
542 463 IOWA LAW REVIEW 531 [1987] 
the instant situation would seem to dictate that the rights of a 
secured creditor ought not be impaired in the absence of a 
physical transfer or assignment of the goods.63 
The Adamatic court's rationale is familiar. If the seller were permitted 
to retain, as part of its inventory, property no longer subject to the secured 
party's lien, the secured party could not rely on the status of that 
inventory.64 This thinking smacks of the law's historical sensitivity to the 
separation of ownership and possession, now frequently referred to as the 
"ostensible ownership" problem.65 
It is particularly difficult to understand why the court picked this case 
to embrace openly what is so clearly a prosecured party position. 66 Contrary 
to the situation in most cases, the secured party in Adamatic actively 
participated throughout the entire course of the sales transaction and was 
not misled by the seller's retention of possession. 67 If the "instant situation" 
referred to by the court68 is one that requires a transfer of the goods, then 
it is hard to imagine one that would not.69 Because Adamatic departs so 
63. Id. at 240, 208 N.W.2d at 107. 
64. Accorci.ing to the court, "the Code generally gives preference to property interests 
which are evidenced either by recording or possession and that, to adopt the view of Chrysler, 
the financier •Jf an inventory would no longer be able to rely on recorded interests and the 
status of his debtor's inventory." Id., 208 N.W.2d at 107. 
65. For more on this problem and the potential role, if any, ostensible ownership concerns 
should play in pinpointing when buyer status is achieved, see infra text accompanying notes 
171-207. For now, it is sufficient that other courts have routinely rejected the secured party's 
assertion that the integrity of the debtor's inventory as a source of information must be 
maintained. The court's response in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 
N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1968) is typical: "If there is a usage of trade which exposes an 
en truster on floor plan to certain risks, these are risks against which he can guard by audits and 
accounting procedures or he can refuse to knowingly expose himself to the risk with the 
particular dealer." For a similiar point of view, see Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 
Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, IO (1978); Farmers State Bank v. Webel, 113 Ill. App. 3d 87, 94-95, 
446 N.E.2d 525, 530 (1983); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 480-81, 
392 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1979); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 216-17, 404 
A.2d 842, 84!• (1979). In the foregoing cases there was no evidence that the creditor had 
actually relied on the debtor's physical inventory. The secured party, however, fared no better 
when such evidence did exist. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, 
Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Wilson v. M & W Gear, llO Ill. App. 3d 538, 
543-44, 442 N.E.2d 670, 673-74 (1982). 
(i6. Althou;jh one commentator suggested "that the secured party should not have his cake 
and eat it too." Skilton, supra note 14, at 17 n.50, that was the secured party's fortune in 
Adamatic. The secured party obtained the progress payments made by Chrysler and was also 
permitted to lay claim to the subject matter of the sale. Even the court's conscience seemed 
slightly troubled: "From the viewpoint of equity, this is an unsatisfactory result, for the record 
shows that ... Chrysler had substantially paid the contract price for all the goods involved." 
59 Wis. 2d at 241-42, 208 N.W.2d at 108. But the court's conscience was soothed by the 
observation that a prepaying buyer has means of self-protection. Id. at 242, 208 N.W.2d at 108. 
("The Code, however, gives broad latitude whereby a prepaying buyer, acting timely, can enter 
into suitable arrangements for his own protection."). Unfortunately for the buyer, this 
protection might not be as easily attainable as the court would lead us to believe. See generally 
sources cited sapra note 41. 
67. In fact, it was upon the secured party's suggestion that the buyer agreed to make 
progress payments on the contract. 59 Wis. 2d at 225-26, 208 N.W.2d at 100. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
69. The di~cussion so far has centered on the Adamatic court's resolution of conflicting 
rights with respect to only one contract of sale when the case actually involved two. The buyer 
A SUGGESTED TEMPORAL DEFINITION 543 
dramatically from what would otherwise be a uniform judicial position, it is 
tempting to pass it off as a decisional aberration without much precedential 
value.70 That, however, would be a mistake. The case has been discussed 
too often by both courts and scholars to ignore it. 71 
B. The Contract Date 
At the security of purchase end of the spectrum, one possibility is 
that attainment of buyer status could occur concurrently with the formation 
of the sales contract.72 It is difficult to say whether there are cases 
supporting this view.73 A major problem in drawing conclusions about 
these cases, aside from piercing the opaqueness of their language,74 is that 
each case is inextricably entwined with its facts, facts that may or may not 
be legally relevant. 
To illustrate, consider two opinions emanating from the same Illinois 
appellate court. In the first case, Herman v. First Farmers State Bank,75 the 
buyer contracted to purchase fertilizer, paid the full purchase price, but did 
not take possession. Then, true to form, the seller's secured creditor 
appeared, took possession of and sold the inventory of fertilizer, including 
the buyer's unsp~cified share. The buyer brought suit to recover from the 
was permitted to take free of the secured party's interest in the goods covered by the so-called 
"first contract" under which the buyer actually received the goods and title passed. The goods, 
however, subsequently were returned to the seller for alterations but, according to the court, 
the secured party's lien never reattached because the seller never reacquired rights in those 
goods. 59 Wis. 2d at 233-34, 208 N.W.2d at 104;. Notice that while the goods were in the seller's 
possession their potential to mislead the secured party was the same as though they had never 
been removed. Curiously, the court never addressed this point. 
70. The court's emphasis on ostensible ownership is the crucial factor that separates this 
case from others. If the opinion is read to require no more than that title must pass before 
buyer status attaches, then the court does enjoy judicial company. See infra notes 105-17 and 
accompanying text. 
71. See, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 
1982); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 378 (D. 
Del. 1985); Thompson v. McMaster (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.), 16 Bankr. 417, 420 (N.D. Tex. 
1982); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d 
319, 321 (1977); Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World Mktg., Inc., 46 Bankr. 458, 462 (D. Mass. 
1985); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 
264-65, 487 A.2d 953, 957 (1985); Anzivino, supra note 15, at 37; Baird & Jackson, Possession 
and Ownership: AnExaminatian of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 210 (1983); Coogan, 
Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Deco.de, 87 YALE LJ. 1012, 1034 (1978); Jackson, Embodiment 
of Rights in Goods and the Concept of Chattel Paper, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1051, 1072 (1983);Jackson 
& Kronman, supra note 41, at 27; Skilton, supra note 14, at 16; Skilton, Security Interests in 
After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Wis. L. REv. 925, 951. 
72. This section will disprove the observation that "[t]he time of contracting, the earliest 
point at which a buyer could conceivably sever a secured party's security interest, is usually not 
seriously considered as an alternative." Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 675. 
73. One court, however, explicitly rejected time of contracting as a suitable test. See 
Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-41, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106-07 (1973). 
74. See Waits, Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The Judicial Process and State Court 
jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 917, 935 ("Even if all judges were Solomons, and all opinions 
were written in the grandest of the Grand Style, problems would remain, for no amount of 
wisdom or effort can eliminate completely the ambiguity of words."). 
75. 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979). 
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secured party the amount paid to the seller, asserting buyer in ordinary 
course status under section 9-307(1).76 
Rejecting the applicability of the Code's passage-of-title rules, the 
Hennan court instead chose to believe that "the focus in a case such as this 
should be on the 'ordinary course of business' requirement of section 
9-307."77 Because the transaction bet\veen buyer and seller was customary, 
the buyer prevailed. Although the opinion can be read as adopting a time 
of contracting approach, it can also be read as requiring more than just a 
mere contract. It bears repeating that cases cannot be read in isolation from 
their facts.18 In Herman the goods arguably were identified to the contract79 
and the purchase price was paid; one cannot say whether either fact is 
relevant. 
In the:· second case, Will-on v. M & W Gear,80 the Illinois court refused 
to deviate from Herman even though the good that the buyer had 
purchased had not yet been identified to the contract Vlhen the secured 
party took possession. Will-on involved the purchase of a grain drill for 
which the buyer had paid in full. When the secured party took possession, 
the seller had an inventory of only two drills, one of which was earmarked 
for delivery to a third party.81 There was no documentation indicating that 
the one remaining drill was to go to the buyer.s2 Downplaying the role of 
identification, 83 the court could see no reason for affording this buyer of 
equipment less protection than a Herman-type buyer of fungibles. 84 But 
once again, in light of the facts of the case, it would not be wise to conclude 
with any degree of certainty that a contract alone is sufficient to protect a 
76. See id. at 477, 392 N.E.2d at 345. 
77. Id. at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 346. The court continued: 
Whether the buyer is a buyer in the ordinary course is not affected by whether there 
has been a completed sale or merely the making of the contract to sell, since the fact 
that title has not yet been transferred as between the dealer and the purchaser does 
not prevmt the latter from being regarded as a buyer in the ordinary course of 
business, insofar as the secured creditor of the dealer is concerned, where the 
transaction between the dealer and the purchaser is ordinary or typical in the trade. 
Id., 392 N.E.~!d at 346 (quoting ANDERSON, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 1-201:25 (2d ed. 
1970)). 
78. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 47 (1930): 
Surely this much is certain: the actual dispute before the court is limited as straitly by 
the facts as by the form which the procedural issue has assumed. What is not in the 
facts cannot be present for decision. Rules which proceed an inch beyowl the facts must be 
suspect. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
79. Comment 5 to§ 2·501 provides in Eertinent part: 
Undivided shares in an identified fungible bulk, such as grain in an elevator or oil in 
a storage tank, can be sold. The mere malcing of the contract with reference to an 
undivided share in an identified fungible bulk is enough under subsection {a) to effect 
an identification if there is no explicit agreement otherwise. 
U.C.C. § 2-501 comment 5. Thus, the buyer in Herman had a strong argument under§ 2-501 
that the fertilfaer was identified to the contract. 
80. 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 442 N.E.2d 670 (1982). 
81. Id. at 539-40, 442 N.E.2d at 671. 
82. Id. at 5.39, 442 N.E.2d at 671. 
83. See id. at 543-44, 442 N.E.2d at 674 ("substantive rights ... sho;lld not tum upon a 
concept w elusive and ephemera!."). 
84.Id. 
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buyer. True, the drill had not been identified to the contract but only a 
mere formality was lacking. Clearly, the drill seized by the secured party was 
the drill awaiting delivery to the buyer.85 Also potentially important is the 
fact of full payment. In the court's own words: "[t]here is no sensible reason 
to deviate from Herman, especially where the retail purchaser has fully 
performed his obligations of the contract."86 
In addition to the foregoing cases, several other cases also have been 
interpreted as endorsing a time of contracting test for determining buyer 
status.87 But once again, the facts of each make the accuracy of that 
conclusion doubtful. In Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams88 the buyers signed a 
"proposal" to purchase a mobile home and made a down payment of 
$600.89 When the seller's president left town with the company's cash, the 
buyers, having lost interest in going through with the sale, brought suit to 
recover their downpayment.90 At their behest and pursuant to a writ of 
attachment, the sheriff randomly levied upon a mobile home on the seller's 
lot, thereby prompting the secured party's intervention.91 The court 
dismissed the buyers' assertion that their contract gave them priority: 
This would be a valid argument if the plantiffs were in fact 
buyers, i.e., if they were either attempting to enforce the contract 
of sale or defending their right to free possession of the property 
after having performed under the contract. However, the plain-
tiffs have, in effect, rescinded this contract by demanding refund 
of their downpayment.92 
What the court meant by this statement is anyone's guess. One possibility is 
that the court intended only to dismiss the relevance of section 9-307(1),93 
and not, as some have assumed, to indicate that the buyers would prevail if 
the section were relevant. 94 
85. Maybe what the court believed to be "elusive and ephemeral," see supra note 83, and 
meant to reject were the technicalities of identification rather than the need somehow to pick 
out the goods destined for the buyer. This view would explain and add content to the 
conclusion of the opinion that "goods need [not] be identified by number before section 9-307 
will protect the retail purchasers." 110 Ill. App. 3d at 546, 442 N.E.2d at 675 (emphasis 
added). 
86. Id. at 545-46, 442 N.E.2d at 675 (emphasis added). 
87. This characterization of the Herman and M & W Gear opinions can be found in Note, 
Is the Good Faith Purchaser Always Right?, supra note 58, at 144-46. 
88. 124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d 580 (1971). In M & W Gear the Illinois court read Truy 
as "implicitly reject[ing] any necessity for identification as a prerequisite to relief and 
protection under section 9-307." 110 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 442 N.E.2d at 674. 
89. 124 Ga. App. at 636, 185 S.E.2d at 581. 
90. Id., 185 S.E.2d at 581. 
91. Id., 185 S.E.2d at 581. 
92. Id. at 637-38, 185 S.E.2d at 582. 
93. Because the buyers no longer wished to be buyers, but chose instead to become judicial 
lien creditors, U.C.C. § 9-30l(b) would supply the governing priority rule rather than U.C.C. 
§ 9-307(1). See 124 Ga. App. at 638, 185 S.E.2d at 582. 
94. See, e.g, Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 855 ("[I1he [Truy] court suggested 
that the process of buying has progressed sufficiently to support buyer in ordinary course 
status when there has merely been partial payment under a contract in unidentified goods."). 
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Another opinion defying easy categorization is Chrysler Credit Corp. v. 
Sharp.95 In Sharp the buyer was a disinterested party but, because the rights 
of a third party were involved,96 her section 9-307(1) qualifications were 
nevertheless the center of attention.97 She had signed an installment sales 
contract, which included a security agreement, to purchase a specific 
identifiable car and had traded in her old car. Although the court held this 
was sufficient to elevate her to the status of a buyer, its reasoning was 
muddled. As Professor Skilton points out, it is impossible to say whether the 
court found that she was a buyer because it wanted the chattel paper 
purchaser to prevail or whether the chattel paper purchaser prevailed 
because the court felt she was, in fact, a buyer.98 The court's language 
suggests the former. 99 If the latter reason correctly states the court's 
position, however, it must be understood that this is more than a mere 
contract to purchase case. There was full or at least partial payment100 and 
95. 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1968). In Herman v. First Farmers State 
Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979), the court cited Sharp for the proposition that 
a buyer need not receive possession or title to qualify under§ 9-307(1 ). Id. at 478, 392 N .E.2d 
at !145-46. Although it is difficult to fault this reading of Sharp, the same cannot be said for the 
apparent conclusion in Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 177, 580 P.2d 8, 
9 (Ct. App. 1978), that the Sharp court held that one who signs a sales contract and security 
agreement, Hithout more, becomes a buyer. The Rex Financial case is discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 101-04. 
96. For a discussion of "satellite rights," see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. The 
suit was a conversion action brought by the assignee of the sales contract and security 
agreement, i .. ?., chattel paper, against the seller's secured creditor who had seized and sold the 
collateral. 56 Misc. 2d at 262, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 526-27. 
97. Although a named defendant, the buyer vanished and was never served. 56 Misc. 2d at 
262, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 527. Not all buyers in all satellite cases will, however, be disinterested in 
the dispute b·~tween the secured party and the holder of the chattel paper. Even if the buyer's 
liability for the purchase price would not be discharged regardless of which party prevails, see 
U.C.C. § 9-206(1), quoted infra note 100, the buyer's stake in the litigation is real. If the seller's 
secured part) wins, the buyer loses the goods but continues to owe the purchase price. If the 
holder of the chattel paper wins, the buyer is still responsible for the unpaid purchase price yet 
obtains the benefit of the proceeds received from the subsequent disposition of the goods. See 
u.c.c. § 9-504(1). 
98. Skilton, supra note 14, at 84. Professor Skilton finds that "[t]his tie-in with the buyer's 
status illustrated in Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Sharp is not completely persuasive." Id. He 
points to U.C.C. § 9-308 and suggests that its application should control the outcome when, as 
here, the chattel paper purchaser is asserting rights as the seller's assignee, not as a retail 
financer who received a security interest directly from the buyer. Id. at 84-85. Professor Skilton 
would be con-ect if the seller's secured party were basing its claim to the car on its interest in 
the chattel paper. But U.C.C. § 9-308 is irrelevant when the asserted interest derives directly 
from the seller, secures the seller's obljgations, and when the secured party repossesses the 
good. See supra note 49. 
99. The court stated: 
The court feels a buyer who makes a purchase on a printed form contract in good 
faith with a full understanding it is a binding contract, who knowingly signs a retail 
installment payment obligation and trades in an old car in addition must, certainly as 
to a retail financer furnishing new value on the strength of such contract and as to an 
entruster giving the dealer wide latitude of sale goods [sic], be deemed a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business, without regard to the technicalities of when title 
[par.ses] .... 
56 Misc. 2d at 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 534 (emphasis added). 
100. Trading in the old car quite obviously constituted partial payment. Indeed, the Code 
itself recognh:es that " '[b]uying' may be ... by exchange of other property," see U.C.C. § 
1-201(9), and the Sharp court labelled the trade-in "valuable consideration." 56 Misc. 2d at 267, 
A SUGGESTED TEMPORAL DEFINITION 0 547 
the good was clearly identified to the contract. 
In contrast to the preceeding cases, Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile 
America Corp.,101 did not involve partial or full payment by the buyers,102 yet 
the court found that the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course.103 Still, 
the case does not resolve whether a valid contract alone is enough to protect 
the buyer. Although the buyers in Rex Financial did not take possession or 
themselves make a payment to the seller, one relevant fact, completely 
overlooked by the court, is that title to the good had passed.104 One can only 
guess whether the court would have felt the same if this fact, which 
necessarily assumes the identification of the good to the contract, were 
absent from the transactional picture. 
To summarize, judicial opinions and academic literature recognize 
that there are cases standing for the proposition that contract formation 
alone is a sufficient prerequisite for buyer statµs. But when each case is 
examined, one finds an additional fact or two that makes one suspect that 
the court is not giving its true thinking or perhaps that the court has yet to 
focus on what its true thinking really is. Because a pure "contract formation 
only" case has yet to appear in print, there is simply no way to know 
whether any court would sanction an approach that defines buyer status 
solely in terms of "a contract to buy." 
288 N.Y.S.2d at 531. But see Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobil Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 
8, 10 (Ct. App. 1978) (no downpayment in Sharp; trade-in merely act of good faith). It should 
be noted that although the contract in Sharp recited that, in addition to the trade-in, a cash 
downpayment of $443.00 was made, the downpayment was not in fact made. 56 Misc. 2d at 
263, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 527. Because the seller agreed to defer the payment until Mrs. Sharp 
received an anticipated tax refund, the court did not think that the nonpayment impugned her 
good faith. Id. at 267, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 531-32. Although more facts are needed, one could 
argue that Sharp is not a part payment case but rather one involving full payment. The seller 
received the car's price (except for the $433.00 due from Mrs. Sharp) from the chattel paper 
purchaser and Mrs. Sharp quite possibly, lost her defense of failure of consideration. See 
U.C.C. § 9-206(1), which provides: 
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or 
lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert 
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or 
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith 
and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may 
be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under . . . 
[Article 3]. A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument 
and a security agreement makes such an agreement. 
u.c.c. § 9-206-1. 
101. 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1978). Rex Financial was, however, another satellite 
rights case in which the seller had been paid by the chattel paper purchaser, and the buyers 
might have lost their personal defenses. See supra note 100. Nevertheless, the case has been 
said to support the view that a buyer is a buyer if there is a valid contract and if the transaction 
is typical in the seller's business. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, 859-60. 
102.119 Ariz. at 176-77, 580 P.2d at 8-9. 
103. Id. at 178, 580 P.2d at 10. 
104. The contract provided that title passed when the security agreement was signed. Id. at 
176-77, 580 P.2d at 8-9; see U.C.C. § 2-401(1) ("[T]itle to goods passes from the seller to the 
buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties."). 
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C. The Passage of Title Date 
A requirement that title pass before buyer status arises lies close on the 
spectrum t.o a definition of buyer in ordinary course that is grounded on the 
buyer's possession, but more to the center.105 The nonleading case of 
Integrity Insurance Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western106 nicely displays the 
reasoning underlying this position and how acceptance of the position 
often forces the manipulation of doctrine to serve "the ends of justice." 
In Integrity Insurance Co. the buyers executed a retail installment 
contract for the purchase of a mobile home, made a cash downpayment of 
more than $400,107 and gave the seller a security interest108 in the home. 
Contrary to the contract's recitation that delivery had occurred, the home 
remained with the seller pending buyers' acquisition of a site on which to 
install it. Not until after a site was found did the buyers learn that the seller's 
secured creditor had taken their home. 
If the court's rhetoric is believed, then the issue of who had title when 
the home was seized was decisive of the outcome. The court based its 
holding on a questionable piggy-backing of Code provisions: "To be a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business ... [section 1-201(9)], there must 
be a sale, which consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer 
for a price ... [section 2-106(1)] .... "l09 Once the court picked the test, the 
105. When the goods are to be shipped to the buyer it would normally be of little 
consequence whether a coun selects a passage of title or possession approach. In either 
instance, the buyer is probably unprotected until the seller loses possession. See U.C.C. §§ 
2-401(2) ("[U]nless othenvise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place 
at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the 
goods ..•• "); 2-503(2), (3); 2-504. A passage of title approach would be more favorable to a 
buyer than one requiring possession only if, by agreement, the transfer of title precedes the 
seller's loss of possession or the delivery of the goods is to occur without the goods being 
moved. See U.C.C. § 2-401(3). 
106. 90 Mhc. 2d 868, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1977). If frequency of discussion and 
citation are nhat make a case a "leading case," then the status of "leading title theory case" 
belongs to Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973). See supra 
note 71 and accompanying text. This status, however, may be the result of an erroneous 
reading of the opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70. Two otl1er cases that also 
may or may not be title theory cases are Thompson v. McMaster (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.), 
16 Bankr. 41;', 419-20 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (unclear from opinion whether title must pass 
to qualify under§ 9-307(1) or whether title's passage only conditions buyer's right to obtain 
possession of good from seller's bankruptcy trustee) and Levine v. Ficke, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
1059, 1060 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (title passed but unclear whether occurrence of passage is 
necessary or merely sufficient). 
107. Although the contract mentioned a $1400 downpayment the buyers actually paned 
with less than that. There was a cash payment of $400 plus an undisclosed amount for the cost 
of installing the unit. 90 Misc. 2d at 869, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 320. 
108. Althotigh the result of the case hinged on the buyers' status, the opinion does not 
illuminate whether they had an interest in the outcome. It was the chattel paper purchaser 
who claimed that the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course. See id. at 869-70, 396 N.Y.S.2d 
at 320. Unlik<: the opinion in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 
525 (Sup. Ct. 1968), see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text, there is nothing in Integrity 
Insurance Co. that cautions the reader that the coun's analysis rested on the absence of the 
buyers as claimants. 
109. 90 Misc. 2d at 870, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 320. Those courts explicitly rejecting title as a test 
did so, not because they were troubled with the test's definitional source, but because of the 
Code's general rejection of title as a means of sorting out respective propeny interests. See, e.g., 
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 377 (Bankr. 
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court was determined to find that title had passed to the buyers. Integrity 
Insurance Co., however, fails to articulate why title had passed. Because the 
agreement did not specify when title passed, the question of who had title 
had to be answered by looking at either section 2-401(2)110 or section 
2-401(3)lll depending upon whether delivery was to involve moving the 
home. Unfortunately, the court never specified which subsection applied. 
Without explanation, the court cryptically reasoned that the seller's contin-
ued possession of the home was in reality constructive possession by the 
buyers because there had been constructive delivery by the seller.112 The 
court then cited section 2-308113 and stated that "delivery took place at the 
dealer's place of business, where the contract was executed, payment made 
and the certificate of sale ... executed and delivered."114 Forgotten was the 
seller's installation obligation, which another court in another case thought 
required the application of section 2-401(2) and the conclusion that title 
remained with the seller until the actual installation of the home.115 
Although the Integrity Insurance Co. opinion is a sloppy one, the court had 
no apparent doubt about the outcome it wanted and why: "All of [the 
buyers'] obligations under the contract had been performed."116 
A passage of title approach, when applied, is not much different from 
the other solutions to the buyer in ordinary course problem. It is less a 
satisfying theory of buyer in ordinary course status than it is a vehicle for 
legitimating an opinion and achieving a desired result. Regardless of 
D. Del. 1985); Wilson v. M & W Gear, 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 542, 442 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1982); 
Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super .. 257, 266, 487 
A.2d 953, 958 (1985). For a discussion of the Code's displacement oftitle location as a relevant 
inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 216-25. 
110. Section 2-401(2) provides in part: 
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at 
which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of 
the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document 
of title is to be delivered at a different time or place •..• 
u.c.c. § 2-401(2). 
111. Section 2-401(3) provides: 
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where delivery is to be made without moving the 
goods, 
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of title, title passes at the time when and the 
place where he delivers such documents; or 
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already identified and no documents 
are to be delivered, title passes at the time and place of contracting. 
u.c.c. § 2-401(3). 
112. 90 Misc. 2d at 870-71, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 321. 
113. Section 2-308 makes the seller's place the place for delivery in the absence of an 
agreement otherwise. See U.C.C. § 2-308. 
114. 90 Misc. 2d at 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 321. The court's reference to § 2-308 makes it 
appear that§ 2-401(3)(b) was the pertinent passage of title rule, with the result that title passed 
at the time and place of contracting. See U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b), quoted supra note 111. If that 
were true then there was no reason for the court to indulge in its constructive 
delivery/constructive possession discussion and the place where payment was made and the 
certificate of sale delivered was irrelevant. 
115. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 377 
(Bankr. D. Del. 1985). 
116. 90 Misc. 2d at 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 321. This observation is also superfluous. 
Performance by the buyer of its obligations does not determine the location of title. 
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whether the result in Integrity Insurance Co. is correct, this sort of malleable 
lawmaking process tends to distort doctrine, making its future uncertain 
and fore~.hadowing future distortions to accommodate contextual and 
factual diff erences.111 
D. The Identification Date 
Beginning with Hol,stein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 11 8 several courts 
ostensibly have held that one becomes a buyer the moment the good is 
"identified" to the contract of sale. 119 From the buyer's perspective this 
solution i~. the next best thing to a time of contracting approach. Identifi-
cation under section 2-501 occurs when a particular good is in some way 
earmarked for a particular buyer. This happens "when the contract is made 
if it is for i:he sale of goods already existing and identified"12o or, if the sale 
is of future goods, "when [they] are shipped, marked or othenvise desig-
nated by the seller as goods to which the contract refers."121 To the joy of 
the buyer and the chagrin of the secured party, identification will, there-
fore, frequently pre-date the passage of title and always pre-date the 
delivery of the goods to the buyer.122 
Courts have offered four principal rationales for making identification 
the event that frees the goods from the secured party's lien. First, 
identification occurs when the buyer begins to acquire those property sticks 
which, when bundled together, will eventually signal what is commonly 
117. To appreciate this observation one need only consider the court's effort to distinguish 
IntEgrity Insuiance Co. in Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 147-49, 386 
N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (1979). The Gaucher coun did so on the suspect basis that § 2-401(2) 
applied in Integrity Insurance Co. only because "the purchase price ha[d] been paid and the 
seller [was] holding the goods for the convenience of the buyer." Id. at 147, 386 N.E.2d at 
1056. On this same point, a recent article suggests that similar concerns had prompted Karl 
Llewellyn's push for the special merchant rules of Article 2. According to the author, 
"Llewellyn did not like the judicial torture, manipulation and misconstruction of contractual 
language or intent to which courts resorted to achieve their desired result. He referred to these 
exercises as 'coven tools' of intentional and creative misconstruction .... " Hillinger, The Article 
2 Ilferchant Rules: Karl Ilewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in 
Commercial u1w, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1169 (1985) (citation omitted). 
118. 122 R.I. 211, 404 A.2d 842 (1979). 
119. See, e.g., Manin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 
1979) (dictum); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 
370, 378 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 
338 Pa. Super. 257, 267, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 
142, 148 (R.I. 1983). 
120. U.C.C § 2-50l(l)(a). At least one commentator has shown an appreciation for the 
circular nature of this definition. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 867 n.80. 
121. u.c.c. § 2-50l(l)(b). 
122. The Code's definitional approach to when identification takes place assumes the 
nonexistence of an explicit agreement contrary to the Code's definition. The panics remain 
free to establish their own rules. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1). The absence of a constraint on 
definition is also evidenced by the recognition that an identification, once made, is reversible. 
See id. comment 2 ("It is possible, however, for the identification to be tentative or 
contingent."): General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 
380 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985) ("[Seller] had the right to substitute the goods under ... § 
2-501(2)."). Also, identification does not require that the goods be in a deliverable state. See 
U.C.C. § 2-5(•1, comment 4; Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 215, 404 
A.2d 842, 844 (1979). 
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looked upon as absolute ownership of the goods.123 Although never clearly 
articulated in the cases, these sticks presumably are being acquired without 
the taint of outstanding interests that were not meant to survive full 
performance of the contract.124 Second, courts have not been shy about 
expressing their pro-buyer orientation. By making priority depend upon 
identification of the goods to the contract, courts naturally foster this 
one-sided solicitude.12s Third, some courts have thought that a comparison 
of section 9-307 and section 2-403 with their statutory antecedents supports 
the view that the Code was intended to improve the buyer's plight.126 
Finally, there is the undeniable fact that the Code de-emphasizes title.121 
Rather than breathe added life into the doctrine by making title the 
determinant of buyer status, some courts have relied instead on the concept 
of identification.12s 
Ignoring for the present the correctness of defining buyer status in 
terms of identification, one should note that the cases supporting this view 
are not without their flaws. Probably the most powerful general criticism is 
that each case lacks a theoretical underpinning. Although courts identify 
specific reasons for choosing identification as the buyer's safe harbor, these 
reasons provide less support for this particular solution than they do for the 
rejection of certain alternative solutions and an end result favorable to the 
buyer. Another problem with these cases, and one that makes their cate-
gorization suspect, is that they leave the legal and business communities in 
the dark concerning the extent to which the buyer's prepayment matters.129 
123. Identification occurs the moment the buyer first acquires "a special property and an 
insurable interest in goods .... " U.C.C. § 2-501(1). From these two sticks flow several property 
rights. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-502 (right to goods on seller's insolvency); 2-716(3) (right to seek 
remedy of replevin); 2-722(a) (right to sue third parties who damage goods). 
124. For cases in which this view has surfaced, see Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'! 
Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1979); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer 
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 267, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985). But see Wilson v. M & W 
Gear, 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 543, 442 N.E.2d 670, 673 (1982) (using comments to § 2-501 to 
show relative unimportance of identification and hence its inappropriateness as test for buyer 
status). 
125. See, e.g., Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 217, 404 A.2d 842, 845 
(1979) ("The identification approach requires inventory financiers to become better ac-
quainted with the inventory and marketing practices of their borrowers. The risk of loss in 
such situations quite properly should be on the lender rather than on the buyer."); see also 
supra note 65. 
126. See, e.g., Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 
257, 266-67, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 
216, 404 A.2d 842, 845 (1979). For a comparison of the present statutes with their 
antecedents, see infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. 
127. See infra text accompanying notes 216-25. 
128. See, e.g., Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 
257, 266, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985) ("[T]he Code expressly diminishes the importance of title 
in ascertaining rights in property .... "). 
129. With the exception of Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745 
(3d. Cir. 1979), which is silent regarding payment, each identification case involves a seller 
who, because of the buyer's payment in cash, paper, or property, has received a portion of or 
all of the purchase price. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 
46 Bankr. 370, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer 
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 261, 487 A.2d 953, 955 (1985); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit 
Co., 463 A.2d 142, 143 (R.I. 1985). 
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Several cases hint that it matters a good dea1.rno 
IV. WEAKNESSES IN THE CONVENTIONAL DEFINITIONS 
As discussed above, the issue of when buyer status attaches has 
received frequent attention from the courts.l31 Not surprisingly, this 
attention has resulted in the expression of four divergent views on the 
issue, 132 a situation that, although unfortunate in itself, is made more 
troubling by the absence of any attempt to develop a conceptual framework 
or to articulate a valid policy ground upon which to justify the selection of 
a particular approach. The next two sections demonstrate that all four 
solutions must be rejected. 133 Each solution is unacceptable for reasons 
peculiar to it and for one reason common to all. 
A. The Contract Date 
Of the four solutions, the one easiest to reject is that which would 
define buyer status in terms of the contract's formation. 134 Quite clearly one 
cannot be a buyer absent a contract. Yet a condition necessary to buyer 
status need not be a sufficient condition. Something more than a contract 
is needed. Just what more is needed is left for later discussion.13s 
A natural starting point for analyzing the contract formation theory, 
and one t~~at seemingly lends itself to a time of contracting approach is the 
Code's definition of "buyer." Section 2-103(1)(a), in not atypical circular 
fashion, informs us that "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods"136 is 
a buyer. Thus, the Code apparently recognizes that buyer status attaches 
130. Consider, for example, the following expression of sensitivity to the buyer's predica-
ment in Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 487 
A.2d 953 (1985): 
The Volunteer Fire Department is a non-profit organization, the revenues of which 
are derived mainly from functions to raise money and direct solicitation of donations. 
After choosing the lowest bidder to supply the fire truck, the Department paid 
$48,000, in advance, on the total purchase price of some $51,000. This prepayment 
remlted under the contract in a 5 percent discount on the price. This evidence may 
indicate limited resources and an attempt to make the best use of those resources by 
reducin;;- the total outlay for the fire truck. 
Id. at 271-72, 487 A.2d at 961 (citations omitted). See also General Ele.:. Credit Corp. v. Gayl 
(111 re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 378 (Bankr. D. Del. 19:35) in which the court 
approved of subjecting the inventory financer "to the risk that a security interest in a dealer's 
imentory will be defeated by these who have made payments on account and don't receive their 
goods." Id. (emphasis added). 
131. See s1;pra text accompanying notes 55-130. 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 56-71 (possession date), 72-104 (contract date), 
10.3-17 (passage of title date) & 118-30 (identification date). 
133. See i71fra te:u accompanying notes 134-262. 
134. The ~.uthor of a student Note would take grave exception with the statement in the text. 
The Note argues that an enforceable contract is all that is needed to cut off a valid security 
interest. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 878. Concerned, however, with the 
problems the seller's continued possession might cause the secured party following the seller's 
default, the Note's author would condition the buyer's priority on the existence of records, 
markings, or labelings which would inform the secured party that the goods have been sold. 
Id. at 876-7~1. 
135. See infra text accompanying notes 242-62. 
136. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(a) (emphasis added). 
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concurrently with contract formation. 13' Apart from theoretical difficulties, 
serious interpretive problems arise when assigning to this Code section the 
role of authoritative source for a temporal definition of buyer status. 
Article I, for example, defines the term central to the inquiry: buyer 
in ordinary course.138 Several Code articles employ this term.139 Section 
2-103(1)(a), on the other hand, is an Article 2 definition of buyer that 
except by analogy applies only to Article 2.140 Absent a legitimate justifica-
tion for doing so, one should not muster section 2-103(1)(a) into Article 
1.141 Indeed, if the definitional ambiguity of buyer in ordinary course is to 
be clarified by drawing upon Article 2 definitions, the definition of "sale" in 
section 2-106(1)142 is the far more logical candidate for the job. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that both courts and commentators have 
succumbed to this temptation.143 
To say that no compelling definitional basis exists for making the 
moment of contracting the critical event is not to say that such an approach 
is erroneous. In assessing the utility of a time of contracting definition, turn 
again to the position taken by one Illinois appellate court that "the focus in 
a case such as this should be on the 'ordinary course of business' require-
ment of section 9-307."144 In short, this court seemed to require for the 
buyer's protection no more than a typical contract in an ordinary business 
transaction. The assumption underlying this position is that it best effec-
tuates the legitimate expectations of the buyer.145 
Given this assumption, it is reasonable to ask just what are the buyer's 
137. Moreover, U.C.C. § 2-106(1) defines "present sale" as a "sale which is accomplished by 
the making of the contract." One should, however, be cautious of overemphasizing this 
definition. Because a "sale" takes place when title passes from the seller to the buyer, id., and 
because title can pass at the time of contracting, see U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b), the definition may 
simply mean that a present sale requires the concurrence of two events-formation of a 
contract and passage of title. 
138. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
139. See supra notes 13, 24. 
140. Indeed, by use of the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires," the preamble to 
U.C.C. § 2-103(1) invites, on occasion, disregard of that section's definitions even if the 
problem at hand is solely within the confines of Article 2. 
141. For a similar thought, see Jackson & Peters, Qp.estf()T Uncertainty: A Proposalf()T Flexible 
Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 
YALE LJ. 907, 952 n.162 ("It is not an easy jump, however, to conclude that the definition of 
the term 'buyer' should influence the definition of the separate term 'buyer in ordinary 
course.' "). In this case, a general reluctance to indulge in the transportation of definitions 
from one article to another is reinforced by the fact that the term "contracts to buy" is absent 
from the definition in § 1-201(9) of buyer in ordinary course; the section refers only to a 
person who buys. This point was noted by the New York Law Revision Commission, 1 N.Y.L. 
REVISION COMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 231 (1955), and in Note, Buyer-
Secured Parry Conflict, supra note 55, at 675. 
142. The word "sale" does appear in U.C.C. § 1-201(9). Because a sale presupposes a 
transfer of title, merely contracting to buy will not necessarily result in a sale. 
143. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text; see also infra note 209. 
144. Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App.3d 475, 479, 392 N.E.2d 344, 346 
(1979). For a discussion of Herman, see supra text accompanying notes 75-79. 
145. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 860 ("The determination of buyer in 
ordinary course status upon the initial contract formation date respects the legitimate 
transactional interest that the buyer has acquired in the goods, whether or not identified to the 
contract.''). 
554 463 IOWA LAW REl'IEW 531 [1987] 
expectations. Since the buyer can expect no more than the seller's perfor-
mance of its contractual obligations, one should consider, for a moment, 
these obligations. The seller's basic obligation is to tender conforming 
goods when and where the contract requires that they be tendered.146 
Moreover. the buyer has every reason to believe that this expectation will 
remain unimpaired pending the agreed upon time for performance.147 To 
preserve these twin expectations, it is hardly necessary to confer buyer 
status at the time of contract formation regardless of the contract's 
typicality. This would be out of step with other Code provisions and would 
give the security of purchase ideal a bit too much security. 
Aside from the need for the goods to conform to the warranties of 
quality that have become part of the contract,148 one should note that the 
drafters of the Code also made sure that, unless expressly excluded, every 
contract will carry with it a basic title warranty that title, when conveyed, will 
be good and that the goods, when delivered, will be free from any security 
interest. 14'l This Code provision is intended to mirror what is presumably 
every buyer's basic title expectation: When the deal is done and the goods 
are in hand, the goods are free from unbargained-for claims and encum-
brances.1M While it does not follow from this that·buyer status must await 
delivery, the provision does detract from the persuasiveness of an expec-
tation justification for a contract date definition.1s1 
Maintenance of the Code's structural harmony suggests further rea-
146. U.C.C:. § 2-301 ("The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver ... in accordance 
with the contract."). 
147. U.C.C:. § 2-609(1) ("A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the 
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired."). If this expectation is 
impaired, § 2-609(1) gives the aggrieved party the right to demand adequate assurance of 
future performance and, until assurances are received, to suspend performance of the 
contract. Id. See generally Leary & Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2?, 31 VILL. L. REv. 399, 463, 
463 & nn. 2B7-38 (1986). 
148. The.Code contains several -sections which bear upon the e}:istence and scope of 
warranties of quality. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 (creation of express warranties); 2-314 (creation of 
implied wammty of merchantability); 2-315 (creation of implied warranty of fitness for 
particular pt1rpose); 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties); 2-317 (cumulation and 
conflict of warranties); 2-318 (third party beneficiaries of warranties). 
149. U.C.C:. § 2-312(1). This warranty is not designated as one of the Code's implied 
warranties. The reason, we are told, is to prevent its exclusion by a general disclaimer of 
implied wammties under§ 2-316(3). U.C.C. § 2-312 comment 6. If the warranty is to be 
excluded by contract the exclusion must be by specific language. U.C.C. § 2-312(2). 
150. As Prnfessor Nordstrom observed: 
The Code does not contain a seller's warranty that the goods are free from a security 
interest while they are in the possession of the seller-only that the goods are delivered 
free from a security interest. Thus, if there are some security interests which are 
terminated in the goods at the time of the delivery, there would be no default in the 
warranty of title even though the goods were subject to a security interest while they 
were held by the seller. 
R. NORDSTRO'.I, LAW OF SALES 187-88 (1970). 
151. If the buyer has reasonable grounds to doubt the seller's future ability to deliver good 
title, the Code sufficiently protects the buyer's expectation by giving the buyer the right to 
demand adequate assurances from the seller and, in the interim, to suspend its own 
performance. See U.C.C. § 2-609; see also Clem Perrin Marine Towing v. Panama Canal Co., 
730 F.2d 181i, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1984) (doubt as to seller's future ability to deliver good title 
justifies dem.md for adequate assurance and, if not forthcoming, suspension of performance 
is justified). 
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sons for refusing to accord buyer status at time of contracting.152 First, the 
Code explicitly states that "[g]oods must be both existing and identified 
before any interest in them can pass."153 Thus, to say that one becomes a 
buyer prior to this time means that certain outstanding interests in 
unidentified goods can be terminated in favor of one who lacks an interest 
in particular goods. It is incentive enough to demand more than just a 
contract in order t0 avoid this sort of nonsensical doctrine.15'1 
Second, time of contracting as a definition would, in some cases, foster 
a degree of discord between the creation of an interest under the Code and 
the severance of that interest. Suppose, for example, that the buyer wishes 
to finance a purchase through a third party lender who intends to secure its 
advance by taking a security interest in the purchased item. Before the 
security interest can attach, the buyer must acquire "rights in the collat-
eral."155 Although the meaning of this phrase is notably obscure, 156 the 
phrase clearly contemplates that the buyer must have some interest in the 
collateral.157 It would be paradoxical to find a sufficient quantum of rights 
in the collateral for purposes of attachment, yet, at the same time, find that 
the buyer has no interest in the collateral under Article 2.158 Having 
concluded that the buyer must, at the very least, have an interest in the 
goods before the lender's security interest can attach, one queries whether 
it is theoretically sound to conclude in turn that the buyer, without an 
interest, can successfully cause the elimination of certain third party 
interests in the goods. More to the point, a period of time would exist 
during which the buyer's priority is not shared by the lender. This result 
would be strikingly at odds with the Code's basic conveyancing principle 
that a transferee receives no less than what the transferor had and intended 
152. As I argued earlier: 
[T]he Code is not an ad hoc collection of commercial statutes, each operating within 
its own sphere of influence, but is rather a system of interlocking parts woven 
together by strands of common policy concerns. It is, therefore, highly desirable that 
a construction of [one] section ... should be congruent with perceived policy 
determinations evidenced by other Code sections. 
Frisch, U.C.C. Section 9-315: A Historical and Modem Perspective, 70 MINN. L. REv. l, 42 (1985). 
153. U.C.C. § 2-105(2). In this respect article 2 is consistent with its statutory precursor, the 
Uniform Sales Act. The latter provided that "no property passes until the goods are 
ascertained." UNIFORM SALES Acr- § 17, 1 U.L.A. 309 (1950) (act withdrawn 1962). 
154. If the problem of ostensible ownership arising from the seller's continued possession, 
see infra text accompanying notes 171-207, were a concern, the absence of identifiable goods 
earmarked for future delivery to the buyer would certainly exacerbate the problem. See 
generally Wilson v. M & W Gear, 110 Ill. App.3d 538, 442 N.E.2d 670 (1982) (Heiple, J., 
dissenting) (secured party on repossession would have no way of ascertaining existence of 
claims to particular item). 
155. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c). 
156. Although U.C.C. § 1-201(36) states that "rights" include remedies, the Code is silent on 
the meaning of the phrase "rights in the collateral." The drafters were of the opinion that its 
meaning should be left for the courts to work out on a case-by-case basis. See U.C.C. § 9-204 
app. I (Reasons for 1972 Change). 
157. See, e.g., Mother Lode Bank v. GMAC, 46 Cal. App. 3d 807, 814, 120 Cal. Rptr. 429, 
433 (1975) (seller's possession of collateral does not give seller rights); Manger v. Davis, 619 
P.2d 687, 680 (Utah 1980) (same). 
158. At least one commentator has noted "the anomaly inherent in extending rights to 
buyers under Article 9 in goods in which they have no rights under Article 2." Smith, U.C.C. 
Survey: Secured Transactions, 39 Bus. LAw. 1395, 1417-18 (1984). 
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to convey. 159 At a minimum, a secured party should succeed to whatever 
priority rig;hts are enjoyed by its debtor. But if the buyer has yet to obtain 
an Article !? interest in the collateral, this logical result is possible only at the 
expense of logical reasoning.160 
The only justification which surfaces for making buyer status coinci-
dent at all times with the contract date is that this definition affords 
maximum protection to the buyer. But affording maximum protection 
without a reason is no justification. Needless to say, such a solution is 
unsatisfactory when, as here, it is decidedly out of step with other Code 
provisions. 
B. The Possession Date 
If one rejects a contract formation definition of buyer status because it 
is prematurely solicitous of the buyer's interests, perhaps the other ex-
treme-extending protection only when the seller has delivered posses-
sion-is acceptable. Although historical support exists for this position, the 
support cuts both ways and thus serves as argumentative fodder for both 
proponent> and opponents of a possession rule. 
Comment 9 to section 1-201(9) indicates that the present definition of 
buyer in ordinary course is predicated upon Section 1 of the Uniform Trust 
Receipts Act's definition of "buyer in ordinary course of trade," which 
explicitly required a delivery .161 Delivery as a watershed event evidently was 
also an attractive idea to at least some of the drafters of the Code. The Code 
initially made delivery a part of buying in ordinary course. Before the 
definition was moved to Article 1, section 2-403(4) of the Code's 1950 draft 
defined buyer in ordinary course as one "to whom goods are shipped 
pursuant to a pre-existing contract or one to whom they are delivered on 
credit."162 
This earlier version of the Code suggests that the drafters intended to 
omit a delivery requirement from section 1-201(9). But did they omit that 
159. This is no more than a corollary of the derivation principle, see supra note 4 and 
accompanyinH text, and has been variously referred to as the "shelter" or "umbrella" principle. 
See Dolan, sut>ra note 6, at 812-13. For example, Article 2's shelter principle is embodied in 
U.C.C. § 2-40:1(1) which begins with the statement that "[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title 
whkh his trar!sferor had .... " 
1130. It has been assumed without question that the foundation for Article 9 "rights" is an 
Article 2 "interest." See, e.g., B. CLARK, supra note 51, § 2.4, at 2-14 ("To a large extent, the 
secured creditor must turn to U.C.C. Article 2 to measure the debtor's 'rights' to goods used 
as C•Jllateral."); Smith, supra note 158; u1e also infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text. 
11>1. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act codified the pre-Code personal property security 
device commonly referred to as the "trust receipt." Trust receipt financing was used primarily 
to finance a dealer·s acquisition of inventory and like the Code, the Act recognized the need 
for certain buyers to take free of the lender's lien. Section 9-2 of the act gave this protection 
to a buyer in the ordinary course of trade which meant "a person to whom goods are sold and 
delit•sred for r,ew value and who acts in good faith and without actual knowledge of any 
limitation on the trustee's liberty of sale .... " UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS Acr § 1, 9C U.L.A. 231 
(1%7) (emphasis added). Also worthy of attention is§ 25 of the Uniform Sales Act, a direct 
antecedent of U.C.C. § 2-403(2). Unlike § 2-403(2), however, § 25 did make delivery to the 
buy1:r an explicit predicate for protection. For the full text of§ 25, see supra note 11. 
Hi2. U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (Proposed Final Draft 1950). The drafters gave no reason for their 
sub~equcnt re:lrafting of the definition. 
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requirement because they intended to change prior law163 or because they 
thought the obvious needed no explicit recognition?164 Notwithstanding 
assertions to the contrary the former conclusion rests on firmer ground. 
Significantly, a number of Code sections specifically depend for their 
operation on a buyer who takes delivery. 165 If delivery is an integral part of 
buying why then the coupling of terms in these sections? Since it is doubtful 
that the drafters sought to be redundant, a reasonable assumption is that 
they never intended buying to depend upon a delivery or change of 
possession.166 
Another issue concerning the drafters' intent is that an explanation is 
needed for the perplexing reference in section 1-201(9) to "receiving goods 
or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale .... " This 
language possibly means that the buyer must receive delivery of the goods 
or at least receive delivery in those situations involving a "pre-existing 
contract for sale."167 This reading is troubling, however, because it ignores 
both the language and the substance of the remainder of the sentence, 
which provides that buying "does not include a transfer in bulk or as 
security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt."168 This last 
clause of the definition has a two-fold purpose: to set forth what buying 
does include and what it does not include. Because the concept includes the 
"receiving goods" situation, the clear implication is that other situations-
some not involving receipt-are also included. But if that is true, then why 
specify only one situation for statutory reference? The answer may lie in 
that same sentence's exclusion of transfers "in total or partial satisfaction of 
a money debt." Perhaps, out of an abundance of caution, the drafters had 
hoped to make clear that the future delivery of goods pursuant to both a 
prior-in-time contract and payment by the buyer is not within the scope of 
the exclusion.169 Viewed in this light, the provision means only that the 
163. For the view that the change manifested the belief that buyer protection need not await 
delivery, see 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITI' INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPER1Y § 26.6, at 696 (1965); 
Warren, supra note 6, at 473 n.23; 1 N.Y.L. REVISION CoMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 232 (1955). 
164. Those who believe that the history of the Code does not suggest a deliberate 
modification of prior law include Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the Unifonn 
Commercial Code, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 39, 61 (1968); Note, Is the Good Faith Purchaser 
Always Right?, supra note 58, at 137. Justice Robert Braucher had the vague recollection that 
the drafters, led by Karl Llewellyn, thought it clear that buying includes delivery and that on 
this point the text was explicit enough. See Letter from Robert Braucher to Homer Kripke 
Uan. 15, 1978) (reproduced in pan in D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 767). 
165. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 7-205, 7-504(2)(b), 9-30l(l)(c). 
166. This same thought has been expressed by others. See, e.g., Dolan, The Unifonn 
Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 TEX. L. 
REv. 1147, 1188 (1978); Jackson & Peters, supra note 141, at 950; Leary & Sperling, supra note 
22, at 80-81. 
167.Jackson & Kronman, supra note 41, at 23, 24 n.96 ("the 'receiving goods' language 
might suggest that delivery is required in the special situation involving a 'pre-existing contract 
for sale.' "). 
168. u.c.c. § 1-201(9). 
169. Commenting on the "receiving goods" language, the New York Law Revision Com-
mission had this to say: 
The theory seems to be that where there is a previously made bilateral contract for the 
purchase, the buyer's obligation, while it is given in exchange for the seller's promise 
to sells [sic] and deliver, and not for the goods, [or] documents ... becomes referable 
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reason for the exclusion in section 1-201(9) does not pertain when the 
goods transferred and the obligation satisfied are transactionally insepara-
ble.110 
Despite the fact that nothing in the relevant Code sections or their 
history compels the choice of a possession-based definition, some commen-
tators argue strenuously for its acceptance.171 The policy-based talisman for 
their position is the now venerable doctrine of ostensible or, as it is 
sometimes called, reputed ownership. This doctrine, with its genesis in the 
celebrated Twyne's Case, 172 is premised on the simple idea that third parties 
rely on a person's possession of property as a signal of ownership. 173 
Because courts have sought to maintain the accuracy of this signal, they 
have viewed as fraudulent any separation of ownership and possession, 
to the la~ter within the policy of the value requirement for good faith purchasers 
without notice when the goods, [or] documents .•. are delivered. 
11'1.Y.L. REvis10N Co~!M'N Sroov OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CooE 235 (1955). 
170. Becau:ie of their nature, the three transactions excluded by the last sentence of § 
1-201(9) have in common the potential for an inequality of value flow. That is, what the seller 
receives i5 lik·~Iy to be worth considerably Jess than what is sold. See Leary & Sperling, supra 
note 22, at 65 ("[11ransactions entered into under economic pressure, as in the case of sales in 
bull, to one who buys in bulk regularly by one who does not customarily so sell, or exchange 
of goods for release of debt, or the giving of security for money borrowed, usually go at a 
reduced price."). This risk is not usually present when the components of the exchange are 
simultaneously agreed upon. 
171. See, e.g., Baird &Jack.son, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 
9, 35 STAN. L, REv. 175, 210-12 (1983); Note, ls The Good Faith Purclw,ser Always Right?, supra 
note 58, at 153-57. 
A related but conceptually distinct question is whether § 9-307(1) should protect a buyer 
when the seller's secured party retains possession. The seminal case, Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. 
Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976), held that it 
does. Id. at m:6-37, 350 N.E.2d at 592-93, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262. For a rnmpling of academic 
viev,s on this question, see Birnbaum, Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Versus 
Possessor:i Security Interests-A Reply to Professor Homer Kripke, 33 Bus. LAw. 2607, 2609 (1978) 
(section 9-307'(1) should protect buyer regardless of possessor's identity); Dolan, supra note 
166, at 1189 (;ecured party in possession should always prevail); Gottlieb, Section 9-307(1) and 
Tanhro Fabrics: A Further Response, 33 Bus. LAw. 2611 (1978) (§ 9-307(1) should protect buyer 
when secured party has possession); Kreindler, The Uniform Commercial Code and Priority Rights 
Between the Sel!erin Possession and a Good Faith Third-Party Purchaser, 82 COM. LJ. 86, 89 (1977) 
(secured partf in possession should always prevail); Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the. 
Uniform Commercial Code Apply Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. LAw. 153, 156 
(1977) (secun·d party in possession should always prevail). The important point is that the 
arguments su.Jporting the Tanbro holding do not by their own force pertain to the need for 
change of possession in all cases. To say that a secured party in possession is super-perfected, 
and hence § 9-307(1) is inapplicable, is not to say that buying requires Fossession when § 
9-307(1) is applicable. 
172. 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). In Twyne's Case, the court applied the then 
recently enact:!d Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz. 13 c.5 (1570), to a transfer of goods by a debtor 
named Pierce to a a·editor named Twyne to satisfy a preexisting debt. 76 Eng. Rep. at 810-11. 
Because the goods never left the possession or control of Pierce and the transfer was, 
therefore, secret, the court held that the transaction was void as to Pierce's other creditors and 
that the transfer justified a criminal action for fraud against the transferee Twyne. Id. at 
813-14. From this case comes the often stated principle of common law that a seller's 
continued possession of sold goods is fraudulent and that the sale is invalid as to creditors and 
purchasers. See, e.g., Ryall v. Rowles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1081 (1749-50); Sturtevant & Keep 
v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 336, 339-40 (N.Y. 1811). 
173. See, e.g., Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg. & Rawle 214, 216 (Pa. 1826) ("It is a rule of general 
policy, which declares possession to be the evidence of property, and the presumption is, that 
every man is trusted according to the property in his possession."). 
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with the result that the ostensible or apparent owner of the property has 
been treated as the true and exclusive owner.174 
It is not difficult to see how the issue of when one qualifies as a buyer 
contains within it the seed of deceptive appearances. Whatever interest is 
received by the buyer prior to a change of possession will, lacking notoriety, 
be ascertainable only from the seller and occasio~ally from business records 
within the seller's control. Because the seller cannot be trusted to disclose 
this information to affected third parties,175 the concern is that the stage is 
now set not only for deliberate deception but also for the innocent 
misleading of those foolish enough not to solicit this information from an 
honest seller.176 Referring in particular to section 9-307(1), commentators 
have argued that those secured parties who conduct spot inspections of 
their debtor's inventory should be able to rely on the presence of an item 
within that inventory as an assurance that the lien still exists and that the 
original priority of the lien continues.177 
The validity of the view that our legal system should continue to give 
primacy to possession, and its natural corollary that buyers must take 
possession to enjoy the Code's protection, can be tested on two quite 
different levels: the empirical and the doctrinal. The empirical correctness 
of the view depends, in large measure, on whether the underlying 
presumption of reliance on possession, which is at the core of Twyne's Case 
and the doctrine of ostensible ownership, is in touch with the realities of 
modern day commercial life. There is evidence that it is not.178 Powerful 
empirical observation supports the conclusion that factors such as financial 
statements, earnings history, commercial credit reports, and credit inter-
change bureau reports, rather than the possession of specific goods, are the 
subject of scrutiny and source of reliance when decisions are made whether 
to extend credit or make a loan.179 •11Jso, it is unlikely the creditor's behavior 
174. One source of conflict that surfaced among American jurisdictions was vihether the 
seller's possession foreclosed inquiry into the reason for that possession. According to some 
courts, the presumption of fraud was irrebuttable, see, e.g., Southern Cal. Collection Co. v. 
Napkie, 106 Cal. App. 2d 565, 569, 235 P.2d 434, 437 (1951); Enterprise Wall Paper Co. v. 
Rantoul Co., 260 Pa. 540, 543, 103 A. 923, 924 (1918), whereas others considered the 
presumption rebuttable, see, e.g., Wooley v. Crescent Auto. Co., 83 N .J .L. 244, 246, 83 A. 876, 
877 (1912). For further discussion of this and other aspects of the ostensible ownership 
doctrine, see l GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§§ 344-363 (rev. ed. 1940). 
175. This cynicism is perhaps unfonunate but, no doubt, often justified. See Baird & 
Jackson, supra note 171, at 179 ("[B]ecause of the possibility of debtor misbehavior, it is 
undesirable to rely on the debtor for information about claims to his own assets."). 
176. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 817 ("The doctrine originated to counteract deliberate 
deception of creditors but has been extended to situations where specific fraudulent intent is 
absent"). 
177. See, e.g., Baird and Jackson, supra note 171, at 210-12. 
178. In recent years, scholars have frequently criticized the doctrine of ostensible ownership 
as being out-of-date. See, e.g., l G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERlY § 15.1, 
at 463-64 (1965); Gordon, supra note 40, at 576-81; Helman, Ostensible Oumership and the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 83 COM. LJ. 25, 32 (1978); Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession 
to Filing Under Article 9 (pt. I), 59 B.U.L. REv. 1, 35-41 (1979); Note, The Uniform Commercial 
Code and an Insolvent Seller's Possession of Goods Sold, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 91-93 (1955). 
179. Summarizing what is thought to be prevailing business practices, Professor Gordon's 
comments are typical of those authors who insist that legal rules premised on the importance 
of possession are inconsistent with what people actually do. He insists that today's creditor 
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will change merely because the transaction involves the acquisition of a 
security interest.180 Whatever information is needed with respect to the 
debtor's assets will come, in most cases, from what is written and not from 
what is seen during an on-site examination of the debtor's premises.181 
It is also unlikely that creditors, following the initial extension of 
credit, will be heavily influenced by possessory evidence of ownership when 
they make decisions to advance additional credit or to press for payment.182 
Even if the creditor were to visit the debtor's place of business, the 
information the creditor would gain from "looking around" would be a far 
cry from the accurate information needed to evaluate the debtor's current 
state of financial health.183 Moreover, if the creditor is concerned with 
inventory--what a buyer in the ordinary course buys-its ephemeral 
presence will exacerbate the unreliability of whatever the creditor suppos-
edly learnc:d from the debtor's possession.184 
While, as a matter of general business practices, there seems to be little 
need for an absolute requirement that a buyer "cure" the ostensible 
ownership problem (there is no real problem) before being able to assert 
priority over other parties, there are strong doctrinal reasons for rejecting 
seldom C.lunts or inspects the property in the debtor's possession before he gives 
credit. Credit is usually given on the strength of the debtor's financial statements, 
particularly his profit and Joss statement (indicating the debtor's potential to pay the 
debt from earnings). The creditor also looks at the current ratio and net asset position 
as shown on the balance sheet to satisfy himself that assets will be available to meet his 
claims if the seller suffers reverses. In addition, a creditor relies on information from 
other creditors and from credit agencies as to how the debtor meets his obligations. 
Gordon, supra note 40, at 577-78. 
180. There is even the real possibility that the perceived value of a security interest to a 
creditor lies not in the right to liquidate specific collateral upon default but in the security 
interest's tendency to prompt voluntary repayment and make the acquisition of further debt 
more difficult. See N. JACOBY & R. SAULNIER, TERM LENDING To Bus1NESS 80-81 (1942). 
131. Although the case against the doctrine of ostensible ovmership "seems incontrovert-
ible-business people look to written, not possessory evidence of ownership," Phillips, supra 
note 178, at 35, the discussion in the text has ignored the argument that even if creditors do 
not themselves check the debtor's possessions, they often rely on auditors who do check. See 
Baird & Jackson, supra note 171, at 184 n.32. Addressing this contention, Professor Phillips 
argues convincingly that available evidence shows that the vast majority of creditors rely on 
unaudited fin1mcial statements that are not normally based on a physical inventory. As a result, 
whatever a visit to the debtor's plant discloses to the creditor or any third party will inevitably 
deviate from what a fonnal audit of inventory, equipment, and commercial paper would 
indicate. See Phillips, supra note 178, at 37-38. Admittedly there will be cases in which a 
creditor does rely on possession of specific property. But legal rules should assume the 
common, not ::he exceptional, case. For this reason, "law premised on a l:ehavioral model that 
assumes reliance upon the debtor's possession of certain assets would mislead that greater 
number of cr<'ditors who do not observe and then tally the debtor's possession.'' Id. at 37. 
182. What matters to creditors are external indicators of fmancial distress. These indicators 
include the cr.~ation of security interests, the filing of lawsuits against the debtor, and a drop 
in credit ratin:~· See Gordon, supra note 40, at 578 n.55; Note, supra note 178, at 92. 
183. See supra note 181. 
184. Referring to an inventory secured party, Professor Dolan has articulated the inherent 
unreliability of even a formal inventory count: 
The holder of a security interest in inventory cannot long rely on a debtor's 
possession because the debtor may soon sell the collateral or have sold it already. 
Reliance on a debtor's possession of inventory is always precarious. An inventory 
.:heck on Monday will not protect against sales on Tuesday .... 
Dolan, supra note 166, at 1158-59. 
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possession as the sine qua non of buying. First, the Code's drafters were 
aware of and did respond to Twyne's Case and its common law and statutory 
progeny.185 The seller's possession of sold goods is the subject of section 
2-402(2).186 This section takes an approach that can almost be described as 
a nonapproach. The section's basic design is to preserve for non-Code law 
the resolution of the rights of the seller's creditors in sold but retained 
goods.187 By employing existing law as the starting point, the Code leaves 
intact, in each jurisdiction, the "Twyne rule" in whatever form it exists at 
present. The section does not, however, incorporate law external to the 
Code in one situation: creditors have no right to void as fraudulent the 
"retention of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a 
merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identifi-
cation."188 
Section 2-402(2) implicitly recognizes that rights in the goods, superior 
to those obtainable by the seller's creditors, begin to flow to the buyer prior 
to delivery.189 If this were otherwise, there would be no need to give explicit 
approval of the use of a state's Twyne rule to upset the sale. Also, the 
exception would not make sense. Why bother to have a rule that it is not 
fraudulent under certain circumstances to leave goods with the seller unless 
an interest has already been obtained that will have priority over the later 
claims of the seller's creditors?190 
Moreover, the Code's definition of "creditor" encompasses a secured 
creditor.191 Although section 2-402(3)(a) states that the section was not 
meant to impair the rights of secured creditors under Article 9, it does not 
preclude the expansion of those rights.192 As Professors Jackson and 
Kronman cogently argue, this might be the case if one accepts that section 
185. In addition to the impact of Twyne's Case on the common law, the vast majority of states 
enacted statutes that, to varying degrees, responded to the perceived evils engendered by the 
seller's continued possession of goods sold. See generally 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES§§ 349-404 (rev. 
ed. 1948). 
186. Section 2-402(1) will be the subject of later discussion. See infra note 261. 
187. Subsection (2) of§ 2-402 provides: 
A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a contract for 
sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent under 
any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated, except that retention of 
possession in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a 
commercially reasonable time after a sale ... is not fraudulent. 
u.c.c. § 2-402(2). 
188.Id. 
189. What is implicit in § 2-402(2) is explicit in § 2-402(1). Subsection (1) quite clearly 
subordinates the rights of some creditors of the seller to certain remedial rights of certain 
buyers. See infra note 261. 
190. Professor Dolan takes this analysis a step further. He argues that because of§ 2-402(2) 
"creditors must assume that merchantsellers-the sellers to whom section 9-307(1), the Article 
9 buyer in ordinary course rule applies-may retain possession of sold goods for a commer-
cially reasonable time." Dolan, supra note 166, at 1156. Hence, the subsection gives fair 
warning to creditors that reliance on the seller's possession of goods is, at best, risky business. 
191. See U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (" 'Creditor' includes ... a secured creditor .... "). 
192. U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a) provides: "Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the 
rights of creditors of the seller (a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions 
(Article 9) .... " 
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9-!307(1) and section 2-402 depend upon one another.193 What one 
witnesses is the less than novel phenomenon that a priority previously 
obtained can be lost. 194 The buyer is, at first, given priority under section 
9-lW7(1). But the goods remain with the seller, and the possibility exists that 
someone, including the secured party, will be misled by the seller's 
possession. At this point in the transaction, and not before, the doctrine of 
ostensible ownership plays its part.195 If the "except'' clause in section 
2-402(2) does not apply and if the seller's possession is fraudulent under 
applicable state law then the buyer's priority under section 9-307(1) will be 
lost and the secured party will once again enjoy its original priority. 196 The 
point is not that recognition of the buyer's secret interest does not involve 
a certain amount of risk for uninformed third parties. Rather, the argu-
ment is that whatever risks do exist are easily minimized; indeed, the risks 
seem to be ones that the drafters in other situations thought acceptable. 
Artick: 9, for example, which does much to reduce the uncertainty of 
property interests, leaves secret interests intact and enforceable in a variety 
of cases. 197 Admittedly, most of these cases result from what the drafters no 
193. Of the opinion that buyer status occurs when title passes, Jackson and Kronman note 
the absurdity of a system which would permit general creditors to win by voiding the sale 
under§ 2-402(2) and non-Code law, but preclude secured parties from doing the same. Thus, 
[t)he assumption that a person who takes an Article 9 security interest should not be 
left in a worse position than if he had taken no Article 9 security interest at all, 
suggests 1hat § 9-307(1) cannot be read to insulate a buyer who leaves goods in the 
posr,ession of his seller from attack under § 2-402(2). 
Jacl:son & Kronman, supra note 41, at 25. 
194. Article 9 provides for a turnabout of priorities in several instances. Suppose, for 
example, that a bona fide purchaser buys equipment subject to a perfected security interest 
immediately following the equipment's removal from State A to State B. Absent a timely 
refiling by the: secured party in State B, the secured party's initial priority over the buyer will 
be lost. See U.C.C. § 9-103(l)(d)(ii); see also U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (change of priorities possible if 
continuation i tatement not timely filed). 
195. The principle at work is not, as Professor Dolan reasons, that the buyer takes less than 
the 5eller had to give, see Dolan, supra note 6, at817, but ratherit is that the buyer forfeits what 
was actually r1:ceived. 
196. See Jackson Sc Kronman,supra note 41, at 25 ("[B]y acquiescing in [seller's] retention of 
pos~ession, [buyer] may be deemed to have relinquished any 'priority' claim it might othenvise 
have had undt!r § 9-307(1)."). Section 2-402 is not the only road to the buyer's loss of priority. 
When the purchased good, left with the seller, is subsequently bought by another party, 
U.C.C. § 2-403(2) may work to divest the first buyer of its interest in the good. See, e.g., 
Metalworking Mach. Co. v. Fabco, Inc., 17 Ohio App. 3d 91, 94, 477 N.E.2d 634, 638 (1984). 
Moreover, U.C.C. § 1-103 offers courts the opportunity to fill whatever gaps are perceived to 
exist in §§ 2-402(2) and 2-403(2) by drawing upon non-Code law, particularly the malleable 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. An often guoted formulation of this dcctrine is the following: 
Equitable estoppel is the effect of tlie voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is 
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might 
perhaps have othenvise existed, either of property, or of contract, or of remedy, as 
against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has 
been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires 
some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy. 
3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISDICTION§ 804, at 189 (5th ed. 1941). 
197. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37) (true lease not subject to notice provisions of Article 9); 
9-302(l)(d) (parchase money security interest in consumer goods can usually be perfected 
without filing or possession); 9-304(4), (5) (certain security interests can be perfected for 21 
days without filing or possession); 9-306(2) (in many instances security interest will survive 
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doubt perceived as pragmatic compromise. But the cases do prove a 
willingness to tolerate misleading appearances in the "right" situations. It is, 
therefore, no solution to the problem of buyer status to say simply that the 
buyer should be prevented from attaining priority because of the trouble-
some problems its secret interest may cause. The inquiry is whether this is 
another proper situation for tolerating these problems. 
Consider once again the plight of the retail financer who directly or 
indirectly finances the buyer's purchase.198 Typically, the financer demands 
and expects to receive a security interest in the item that is effective against 
third parties, including an earlier secured party with an interest in the 
seller's inventory. This should be easily attained if the financer complies 
with Article 9's attachment requirements199 and the sale goes according to 
plan. But it is precisely because not all transactions go according to plan 
that a security interest is needed. Since things can go awry at any time, the 
financer is necessarily interested in obtaining a lien and priority at the 
moment the advance is made, which, quite frequently, predates the buyer's 
possession of the goods. When this is the case, the financer's willingness to 
participate will depend on the answers to two questions. First, will the buyer 
have "rights in the collateral"200 while the goods are still with the seller? 
Second, if the security interest can attach at that time, what priority will that 
interest have relative to others? 
To answer the first question one need only look at the flow of property 
interests from seller to buyer that can pass irrespective of the physical 
location of the goods. These interests include a special property interest201 
and insurable interest,202 title,2°3 and the right to immediate possession.2°4 
Surely, the existance of these rights must be sufficient to support an 
enforceable security interest.205 With the seller's bundle of rights stripped 
collateral's transfer to third party); 9-402(7) (security interest in collateral acquired within four 
months following debtor's change of name will be perfected). See generally McLaughlin, "Seek 
But You May Not Find": Non-UCC Recorded, Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests Under Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 953 (1985). 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54. 
199. See U.C.C. § 9-203. 
200. Before the financer's security interest can attach, the buyer must have "rights" in the 
good. See id. § 9-203(l)(c). 
201. See id. § 2-401(1). 
202. See id. § 2-501(1). 
203. See id. § 2-401(3). 
204. See id. § 2-716(3). 
205. The certitude of the statement in the text belies what is, in fact, a point of contention 
among courts. Some courts have reached a conclusion similar to that in the text, see, e.g., In re 
Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 327, 337 (D. Me. 1968); Re.x Fin. Corp. v. Mobile 
Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 177-78,.580 P.2d 8, 9-10 (Ct. App. 1978); International Harvester 
Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492-94, 211 S.E.2d 430, 
433-34 (1974), while some courts have not. See, e.g.,In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d 
349, 356-58 (3rd Cir. 1969); Galleon Indus., Inc. v. Lewyn Mach. Co., 50 Ala. App. 334, 
338-39, 279 So. 2d 137, 141, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 779, 279 So. 2d 142 (1973); First Nat'l Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284, 288-89, 167 S.E.2d 190, 195-96 (1969); Evans 
Prods. Co. v.Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 365-66, 421P.2d978, 980-81 (1966) (in bane). Contrary 
viewpoints can also be found among commentators. Compare Anzivino, supra note 15, at 44-45 
("It is this writer's opinion that possession is the second required element entitling the debtor 
to rights in the collateral.") (footnote omitted) with B. CLARK, supra note 51, at 2-14 ("[I]t would 
seem that the debtor has rights to a piece of equipment which he has purchased from a dealer 
but which has not yet been delivered to him.") (footnote omitted). 
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to naked possession206 the situation is conceptually no different from that 
in which a true owner attempts to grant a security interest in an item 
temporarJly bailed with another. No one would doubt the owner's ability to 
do so even though the owner has temporarily given up possession. If this is 
so, what sense does it make to deny the same power to an owner who has 
yet to gain possession? To be sure, this does not reveal what rights must 
flow to the buyer to satisfy section 9-203(l)(c), but it does indicate that 
possession is not essential. 
From the financer's perspective, knowledge that a lien can attach 
without the need for the buyer to take possession is not comforting without 
the corresponding knowledge that the lien will have, at a minimum, priority 
over the seller's secured creditor. The lien will, of course, have priority the 
moment section 9-307(1) applies. To forestall its application until the buyer 
acquires possession would, as one court admonished, "make it impossible 
for retail finance companies to do business with any dealer unless the 
[seller's secured creditor] were directly a participant .... The proliferation 
of papen10rk would be a giant step backwards in modern commercial 
practice."l.'.07 In short, one has another "right" situation for suffering 
whatever evils the seller's ostensible ownership brings. 
C. The Title Date 
The choice of title as the determinate of buyer status is said to be 
compelled by a combination of several of the Code's definitions: the section 
1-201(9) definition of "buyer in ordinary course" comtemplates a "sale" 
and, according to section 2-106(1), "a 'sale' consists in the passing of title 
from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401)."208 The legitimacy 
of this definitional piggy-backing depends on the tacit assumption that the 
definition of sale in Article 2 applies equally to terms defined in Article 1. 209 
This assumption might be questioned. As argued above, the transportation 
of definitions from one Code article to another must be made with 
caution.2H• Even if transportation were acceptable in this case, perhaps one 
should not overemphasize the appearance of "title" in the definition of sale. 
206. If the seller has been paid in full, also lacking would be those rights that were incident 
to the seller's lien in pre-Code days but are now the subject matter of the Code. See U .C.C. §§ 
2-507(2), 2-702(1), 2-703(a), (f), 2-705(1). Although a buyer with an insurable interest and title 
wa~ hypothedzed, it is, nevertheless, possible that the seller still retains an insurable interest. 
This would l:e the case where the risk of loss has yet to shift to the buyer. See Jason's Foods, 
Inc. v. Peter Eckrick & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214, 216-19 (7th Cir. 1985). 
207. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 
1968). 
208. See supra teKt accompanying notes 109-16. 
209. Given this underpinning, it is understandable that Professor Jackson, once a supporter 
of title as the test for buyer status, Jackson & Kronman, supra note 41, at 23, seemingly 
abandoned the title test for one that is not the product of such a mechanical analysis. See Baird 
& Jackson, supra note 171, at 210-12. 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43. Before one argues that the Article 2 
definition of sale is inapplicable to Article 1 definitions, one must be prepared to answer 
Professor Smith's interesting riddle: "[W]hat happens to a term that is defined in Article 1 in 
terms of 'sale' when it is applied in Article 2?" Smith, supra note 164, at n.88. 
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It could be that its only purpose is to differentiate those transactions that 
are within the intended scope of Article 2 from those that are not.211 
On a purely textual level, other arguments have been made against 
adopting a definitional solution that is itself entirely textual. One argument 
follows from a comparison of the language of subsections 2-403(1)212 and 
2-403(2)213 and the other from a literal reading of section 2-403(2) alone. 
The argument based on a comparison of the two subsections is that because 
subsection (2) refers to the entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant, 
and subsection (1) speaks of title, voidable title, and good faith purchasers, 
the drafters meant for title to be material only to the operation of the latter 
subsection.214 The second argument rests on the paradoxical situation 
which would result if title were decisive. As described by Professors Peters 
and Jackson: 
Since an "entrusting" includes retention of possession without 
title, it would be impossible for such an entrustee to pass title. 
That is, if title were indeed crucial, no buyer in the ordinary 
course of business could ever arise until after § 2-403(2) had 
operated, which it could not do for lack of a buyer in the ordinary 
course of business.21s 
While these arguments may have merit, their persuasiveness is under-
cut by the same weakness inherent in the position they seek to counter, that 
is, an overreliance on literalism. This approach is particularly inappropriate 
in this case because the approach moves in two different directions. A more 
fruitful inquiry would be to look at some of the broader policy implications 
of defining buyer in terms of title. 
In pre-Code days the concept of title served as the jack-of-all-trades in 
sales law. One had only to decide who had title and then the answers would 
neatly follow to such diverse questions as where the risk ofloss lay, whether 
the seller could maintain an action for the price, whether the buyer could 
replevy the goods, and whether the seller's or buyer's creditors could levy 
on the goods.216 But for Karl Llewellyn the neatness of such a singularity of 
issue was not worth its price: 
The quarrel thus is, first, with the use of Title for purposes of 
decision as ifthe location of Title were determinable with certainty; 
and second, with the insistence on reaching for a single lump to 
solve all or most of the problems between seller and buyer-and 
even in regard to third parties.211 
211. T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND I.Aw DIGEST § 2-106(A](l] 
(1978); see also Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 678. 
212. For an overview of the text of this subsection, see supra note 20. 
213. For the text of this subsection, see supra note 24. 
214. Smith, supra note 164, at 61. But see Leary & Sperling, supra note 22, at 81 ("Section 
2-403(1) does use the word 'title' ... but section 2-403(2) speaks of rights, not of title. Thus it 
is not clear whether the question of title is 'covered by' section 2-403, nor that title is 
material."). 
215.Jackson & Peters, supra note 141, at n.163. 
216. 1 N.Y.L. REVISION COMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 445 (1955). See 
generally Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 159 (1938). 
217. Llewellyn, supra note 216, at 166. 
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Thus, when the drafting of the Code began, Llewellyn was convinced 
that the time had come to scrap title as a means to resolve sales controver-
sies. The unpredictability of application21s and emptiness of rational 
content219 of title led Llewellyn to fear that if its then role of prominence 
were enshrined in the Code the effects would be intolerable. As he saw it, 
elimination of the doctrine was "one of the great clarifications that has been 
offered to the law of these United States over many years."220 Making the 
most of their opportunity, Llewellyn and his crew of drafters made the bold 
move of rdegating title to backseat status in the Code.221 In its place are 
specific rules premised on considerations peculiar to the problem at 
hand.222 Gone is the one-issue-fits-all approach of pre-Code law. But the 
drafters did not completely ignore the concept of title: Section 2-401 
provides rules for determining who has title, if that matters. The preamble 
to the section indicates the limited relevance of the section's rules. The rules 
should be consulted only if a Code "provision refers to such title"223 or 
when "situations are not covered by the other provisions of this Article and 
matters concerning title become material. . . ."224 The reference in the 
official comment to the class of relevant title situations serves only to 
remind one that title will no longer be used to solve sales problems. It still 
may be necessary, however, to the application of various regulatory 
statutes.225 
218. Llewellyn explained: "Nobody ever saw a chattel's Title. Its location in Sales [sic] cases 
is not discovered, but created, often ad hoc." Id. at 165. 
219. Refening to the concept of"title" or "property," Llewellyn fancifully wrote: "when, in 
addition, 'the property' bounces around from party to party according to the issue, it begins 
to look as if 'the property in the goods,' as an issue-determiner, were in the merchantile cases, 
a farmer far from the dell, and none too well adjusted to the new environment." Llewellyn, 
Across Sales or• Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REv. 725, 733 (1939). 
220. 1 N:Y.L. REVISION Cow.l'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 160 (1955). 
221. The unimportance of the location of title is a theme the Code's drafters thought worthy 
of repetition. See U.C.C. §§ 2-401 & comment l, 2-505 comment l, 2-706 comments 3, 11, 
9-101 comment, 9-202 & comment, 9-311 comment 2. Although most members of the 
academic community were pleased with the Code's reformation of existing law, see, e.g., 
Corbin, The IJnifonn Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 824-27 
(1950); Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-8 (1951), 
there were those who were not. See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial 
Codi', 63 HAR'!. L. REv. 561, 562-72 (1950). 
222. For example, the Code prescribes a separate set of rules on risk of loss, see U.C.C. §§ 
2-509, 2-510, buyer's right to replevin, see U.C.C. § 2-716, and seller's right to recover the full 
price, see U.C.C. § 2-709. 
223. U.C.C. § 2-401. Several Code sections, typically of little importance, do contain a 
refC'rence to title. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 (warranty of title); 2-326(3), 2-327(1) (incidents of sale 
or return); 2-501(2) (seller's insurable interest in goods); 2-722 (cause of action for injury to 
goods). U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (security of purchase and good faith purchase rules) is also a title 
pro1•ision, but it is omitted from this list because of the relative importance of the section. 
224. u.c.c. § 2-401. 
225. Section 2-401 comment 1 provides: 
This section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation 
should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regulation depends 
upon a "sale" or upon location of "title" without further definition .... It is therefore 
necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this Article in case the 
courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the "private" 
Jaw. 
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In concluding that the demise of title was an integral part of 
Llewellyn's plan to rationalize and modernize commercial law, should one 
also conclude that he and the other drafters would have wished the 
invigoration of title by making a buyer's protection depend on having 
received it?226 Although evidence suggests that the Code is not the panacea 
Llewellyn dreamed it would be,227 other evidence suggests that the aboli-
tion of reliance upon title has been beneficial. Take, for example, the issue 
of risk of loss. Once a frequent subject of appellate opinions, it now so 
infrequently surfaces in print that its appearance is worthy of comment.22s 
D. The Identification Date 
Of the four commonly discussed points along the spectrum for 
defining buyer status, the most reasonable choice seems to be that of 
"identification."229 Although the event of identification itself is indepen-
dently insignificant,23o it becomes significant through the application of 
various Code sections.231 In particular, identification signifies the moment 
when the buyer acquires a "special property" in the goods.232 Unlike 
identification,233 the concept of special property is not created by the Code, 
but has long been part of the common law.234 The concept has traditionally 
heralded that point in the sales transaction at which the buyer begins to 
accumulate those rights that will eventually constitute absolute ownership 
U.C.C. § 2-401 comment I. See State v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 356 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1978) (§ 2-401 used to decide sales tax issue); Elliot v. State, 149 Ga. App. 579, 580-81, 
254 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1979) (§ 2-401 used to decide criminal law issue). 
226. Even absent the Code's formal de-emphasis of title, a title approach to the buyer status 
problem is inappropriate for the same reason that all of the previously discussed tests are 
inappropriate: use of a title approach is unsupported by any convincing transactional theory. 
On the relationship between title and rational decisionmaking, see Dolan, supra note 166, at 
1193 n.243 ("[the] buyers' and sellers' rights emanate from contracts of sale and Article 2, not 
from metaphysical presumptions conjured up by freighted language."); see also Gordon, supra 
note 40, at 587 (title approach objectionab1e because "it sets up an artificial barrier between the 
analysis and the issue to be decided"). 
227. See generally White, Evaluating Article 2 of the Unifonn Commercial Code: A Preliminary 
Empirical Expedition, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1262 (1977) (examining impact ofrecodification of sales 
law under U.C.C. Art. 2). 
228. Professors White and Summers note that a "cursory search" has revealed 59 pre-Code 
risk of loss cases and a "trickle" of post-Code cases. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CooE, § 5-1, at 176 n.6, 177 n.8 (2d ed. 1980). For comments on recent risk ofloss 
cases, see Frisch, Leary & Wladis, Unifonn Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions, 
Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 41 Bus. I.Aw. 1363, 1380-82 (1986). 
229. See U.C.C. § 2-501; supra text accompanying notes 118-28. 
230. U.C.C. § 2-501 is primarily definitional. With the exception of equating identification 
with a special property and an insurable interest in the goods, the section's basic purpose is to 
prescribe when identification occurs. Id. at comment 3. 
231. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-401(1) (title cannot pass prior to identification); 2-502 (identifi-
cation, in part, conditions buyer's right to recover goods from an insolvent seller); 2-716(3) 
(identification central to buyer's replevin rights). 
232. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1). 
233. Identification as a separate concept appeared for the first time in the Code. It does, 
however, have its statutory antecedents. See UNIFORM SALES Acr § 18(1), 1 U.L.A. 8 (1950) (act 
withdrawn 1962) (reference to "specific or ascertained" goods). 
234. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 822. 
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in the goods.2J5 This conceptual springboard, which takes the buyer from 
a mere expectation of receiving conforming goods to a cognizable interest 
in particular goods, is continued under the Code.236 
Given the fact that the rai,son d'etre of the buyer in ordinary course 
doctrine is the important economies that are achieved by making goods 
quasi-neg<)tiable,231 one finds compelling the temptation to conclude that 
whatever protection is afforded to the buyer was meant to begin when the 
buyer's interest begins. No acceptable justification exists for forcing the 
buyer to shoulder the risk of an innocent purchaser until the buyer is lucky 
enough to have seen the transaction through to its completion.238 Further-
more, in :;ome cases, section 2-402(1) protects the buyer's specific propri-
etary interest in goods against the interests of the seller's creditors at the 
instant the buyer's interest arises.239 This, for some, reinforces the view that 
the Code •:ontemplates identification as the event that starts to shift the risk 
of the innocent purchaser from the buyer to others who deal with or claim 
through the seller.240 
It would be a mistake, however, to adopt this approach. While making 
identification the reference point for buyer status would further the basic 
purpose of the buyer in ordinary course doctrine,241 it would also do so 
when unnecessary and with anomalous consequences. For reasons that will 
soon become apparent, a buyer's proprietary interest in goods needs no 
protection unless the buyer also has a proprietary power 01;er the goods. 
V. A SUGGESTED TEMPORAL DEFINITION 
This Article has looked at the several contemporary views of when 
buyer status attaches and has found that each lacks a persuasive justification 
235. ld. at 822-23. 
236. See U.C.C. §§ 2-105(2) ("Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest 
in them can pas5."); 2-501(1) (''The buyer obtains a special property .•. in goods by 
idmtificatkn ... , . "). . . . l'he Codf· 1s silent on the nature of the residual property interest m the seller once the 
special property is obtained by the buyer. There is only the noncommittal statement in§ 9-113 
comment 4 that 
[t]he ieller's interest after identification and before delivery may be more than a 
security interest by virtue of explicit agreement under Section 2-401(1) or 2-501(1), 
by virtue of the provisions of Section 2-401(2), (3) or (4), or by virtue of substitution 
pursuant to Section 2-501(2). In such cases, Article 9 is inapplicable by the terms of 
Section 9-102(l)(a). 
U.C.C. § 9-113 comment 4. 
237. See gmeral(v Hawkland, supra note 6 (discussing commercial law remedies for improper 
tender of title to chattels). 
238. The :;tatement in the text naturally assumes the unpersuasiveness of the argument that 
ostensible ownership concerns are of paramount importance. See mpra text accompanying 
notes 171-207. 
239. U.C.G. § 2-402(1) provides: "Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of 
unsecured creditors of the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a contract 
for sale are mbject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods under this Arricle (Sections 2-502 
and 2-716)." See also infra note 261. 
240. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 166, at 1156. 
241. Id. at 1157 ("By opting for identification, the Code appears to promote the interests of 
buyers. In fact, it promotes the interests of a commercial society. It fosters sales. It encourag~. 
buyers to buy and pay early."). 
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for its adoption.242 But the separate criticisms heaped upon each fail to 
suggest a convincing alternative. It is only when the deficiency common to 
all accepted definitions is realized that the necessary materials for construct-
ing a theoretically sound temporal definition become apparent. 
Kwikset Division of Emhart, Industries v. Mohawk Industrial Design Enter-
prises (In re Pennsylvania Conveyor Co.)243 may clarify the problem. Kwikset 
had contracted to purchase a customized press from Mohawk Industrial 
Design Enterprises, for a price of $69,375.25.244 When the press was 
substantially completed and after Kwikset had paid $54,377.25 toward the 
purchase price, the press was repossessed by Mohawk's secured creditor, 
PennBank.245 Kwikset brought suit seeking possession of the press upon 
payment of the remainder of the purchase price.246 PennBank argued that 
Kwikset had no right of possession because the stringent prerequisites of 
section 2-502 had not been satisfied.247 
The bankruptcy court found for Kwikset.248 In so doing, it drew a 
sharp distinction between rights under section 2-502 and rights under 
section 9-307(1).249 Acknowledging Kwikset's inability to recover from its 
seller under section 2-502, the court concluded that if Kwikset were to pay 
the balance of the purchase price it would qualify for buyer in ordinary 
course protection under section 9-307(1).250 
The Kwikset approach illustrates how courts and commentators have 
consistently failed to perceive the anomaly that one can be a buyer in 
ordinary course absent the availability of a possessory remedy against the 
immediate seller.251 Had Mohawk remained in possession of the press, 
242. See supra text accompanying notes 131-241. 
243. 31 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982). 
244. Id. at 681. 
245.Id. 
246.Id. 
247. Id. at 682. Section 2-502 provides: 
Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not been shipped a 
buyer who has paid a pan or all of the price of goods in which he has a special 
propeny under the provisions of the immediately preceding section may on making 
and keeping good a tender of any unpaid ponion of their price recover them from 
the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first 
installment on their price. 
(2) If the identification creating his special propeny has been made by the buyer he 
acquires the right to recover the goods only if they conform to the contract for sale. 
u.c.c. § 2-502. 
248. 31 Bankr. at 683. 
249. Id. at 682-83. 
250. The court based its conclusion on notions of equity: "The purchaser in the instant case 
paid all but $15,000 of the $69,375.25 purchase price, the goods were identified to the contract 
and were left in the manufacturer's possession for the sole and only purpose of the making of 
two minor corrections and the shipping of the completed article." Id. at 683. 
251. Most courts never consider the link between a buyer in the ordinary course and his or 
her possessory right against the immediate seller, but on occasion a coun will assen that no 
such link exists. See, e.g., Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World Mktg., Inc., 46 Bankr. 458, 460-61 
(Bankr. D Mass. 1985) ("[Ilhe rights of a buyer against a secured pany are not determined by 
the buyer's rights against the seller."); Wilson v. M & W Gear, 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 540, 442 
N.E.2d 670, 672 (1982) (noting that U.C.C; § 9-307(1) protects buyer irrespective of right to 
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Kwikset, because it failed to meet the requirements of section 2-502, would 
have been relegated to that hapless class of unsecured creditors for whom 
full recovery is seldom a reality. Instead, because of the fortuitous circum-
stance of PennBank's repossession, Kwikset was assured the benefit of its 
original bargain. 
Another version of the same objection to the separability of a posses-
sory rem1;!dy from the rights of a buyer in ordinary course views the 
situation from the secured party's perspective. Before the repossession, 
PennBank, not Kwikset, had a property interest in the press.252 And 
PennBank, not Kwikset, had the legal right of possession.253 But all this 
changed once the right of possession was exercised. When PennBank 
e:cercised its exclusive right to repossess the printing press, the exclusivity 
of that right was destroyed. In other words, once a secured party with the 
sole and {:xclusive right of possession repossesses the collateral, its right to 
retain po:;session is lost. This is not only bad policy,254 but also logically 
inconsistent255 and linguistically incoherent. 
A second argument in favor of defining buyer status in terms of buyer 
remedies is that such a definition, more than any other, comports with the 
scope and purpose of the good faith purchase doctrine embodied in the 
Code. Because the doctrine seeks to facilitate market trading by reducing 
title uncertainty, its application is premised on the implicit assumption that 
a point in the sales transaction has been reached at which the buyer has a 
maintain replevin action); Gordon, supra note 40, at 575 ("[Ilhe rights of the buyer against the 
seller's creditors should not tum on his rights against the seller."). 
252. PennBank had a perfected security interest in all of the debtor's inventory, accounts 
receivable, machinery, equipment, and proceeds. Kwikset, 31 Bankr. at 681. A security interesr. 
is defined by the U.C.C. as a property interest. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (" 'Security interest' 
means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of 
an obligation."). 
253. Kwik:.:et, 31 Bankr. at 681; see also U.C.C. § 9-503 ("[U]nless otherwise agreed a secured 
party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral."). 
254. Remember that not all buyer in ordinary course scenarios involve a secured party. If 
the contestant is an "owner" who has entrusted goods with a merchant having § 2-403(2) 
power to transfer the owner's interest in the goods, clearly divorcing the buyer's rights from 
the buyer's remedies is absurd. A court would be in the position of having to tell the owner that 
what is his is his until he takes it. That is, while the goods are with the merchant, only the 
owner has the legally cognizable right to remove them from the merchant's possession. Once 
the owner has done so, however, the right to retain possession is subordinated to the then 
superior po:;sessory right of the buyer in ordinary course. The result of this would be that the 
merchant or seller who least deserves possession would retain possession. Because the owner 
or secured party could be made to deliver the goods to the buyer, there would be little 
incentive for either party to want possession. And the buyer cannot get possession until either 
obtains pos!ession. 
255. Professor Skilton makes the following potent observation: 
But, you may ask, how may the buyer in ordinary course of business, with the seller 
still in possession, assert his rights against his seller's secured creditor, if he does not 
have property rights under sections 2-716 and 2-502? ... By an action based in 
appropriate cases on conversion? By an equitable decree? The answer must be, by 
some remedy under section 1-106(2) to carry out section 9-307(1). However, if the 
court decides that he is a buyer in ordinary course of business without rights in 
identified goods which are enforceable, the buyer is a man without a remedy until he 
receiven delivery. 
Skilton, supra note 14, at 20-21. Surprisingly, this excerpt indicates that Professor Skilton 
seems to have begrudgingly accepted the inevitability of this state of affairs. 
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title expectation needing protection. In assessing where that point lies, it is 
helpful to think of a sale as the movement of a variety of property sticks 
from seller to buyer. Absent a stick in the buyer's bundle that gives the right 
to take possession of the goods, the state of the seller's title is immaterial. If 
the seller breaches, the buyer's expectations are satisfied by an award of 
monetary damages. If there is no breach, more sticks will come and the 
cleansing of the seller's title can wait. The buyer's title concerns crystallize, 
however, once the buyer obtains the legally cognizable right to compel the 
seller's performance. It is with this stick in hand that the buyer's legitimate 
claim to good faith purchase treatment materializes. 
To see why this is so, one need only understand the Code's approach 
to buyer's remedies. A central assumption of Article 2 is the homogeneity 
of goods. If the seller does not deliver the goods, the buyer will, most often, 
be able to obtain similar goods elsewhere. As a result, the buyer's expecta-
tion interest is fully vindicated by a damages award based on an imagined256 
or actual substitute purchase.257 There are, however, situations, sufficiently 
out of the ordinary, in which protection of the buyer's expectation demands 
that the remedy be the right to obtain possession of the goods from the 
seller. Thus, the buyer has the limited right to recover the goods in certain 
insolvency situations under section 2-502,258 the right to specific perfor-
mance under section 2-716(1),259 and the right to replevin under section 
2-716(3).260 
256. One Code formula for measuring buyer's damages is the difference between the 
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price. See 
U.C.C. § 2-713. The import of this remedy is that a market exists giving the buyer the 
opportunity to enter into substitute transactions if the goods are still desired. If the buyer is 
forced to pay more that the contract price, the excess is recoverable from the seller. While in 
theory this calculation should put the buyer in the position he would have occupied had the 
seller performed, in practice it may not. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to 
the Sale of Goods Under the Unifonn Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 
258-60 (1963). 
257. A measure of damages more accurate than the speculative market price/contract price 
formula is a calculation based on an actual substitute purchase. Section 2-712 permits a buyer 
to "cover" by buying elsewhere and to recover from the seller the difference between the cover 
price and the contract price. See U.C.C. § 2-712. 
258. For the full text of§ 2-502, see supra note 220. The purpose of the section is to give the 
buyer a right to the goods when, because of the seller's insolvency, a monetary claim would be 
less valuable at best and valueless at worst. But the stringent requirements of§ 2-502 make the 
section more a remedial mirage than a viable alternative to damages. 
259. According to§ 2-716(1) specific performance is available "where the goods are unique 
or in other proper circumstances." Apparently hoping to foster a liberalization of the remedy, 
see U.C.C. § 2-716 comment l, the drafters offered an expanded definition of "uniqueness" 
that takes into account "the total situation which characterizes the contract .... and 'other 
proper circumstances'" that might include the inability to cover. U.C.C. § 2-716 comment 2. 
Despite the ambiguity of the tests chosen by the drafters, the tests indicate that the remedy of 
§ 2-716(1) was never intended to be available absent the buyer's actual or practical inability to 
tap an alternative source of supply. For a valuable analysis of§ 2-716(1) and the buyer's right 
of specific performance, see generally Greenberg, Specific Peiformance Under Section 2-716 of the 
Unifonn Commercial Code: "A More liberal Attitude" In the "Grand Style,'' 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 321 
(1982); Kronman, Specific Peiformance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1978). 
260. Section 2-716(3) provides: 
The buyer has a nght of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after 
reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been 
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Observe the similarity of purpose between the good faith purchase 
doctrine and the Code's possessory remedies. The essence of both is the 
perceived utility of protecting the buyer's expectation interest. As a matter 
of logical consistency, it is impossible to square this common goal with a 
decision to withhold buyer in ordinary course status until some time after 
the buyer becomes legally entitled to the goods. Odd indeed would be a 
legal regime that bestows a possessory right to protect the expectation 
interest but, at the same time, leaves that right unprotected because of the 
inapplicability of a doctrine specifically designed to protect that very same 
interest.261 Conversely, if one is unwilling to say that the buyer, not the 
seller, has the superior right of possession, what justification is there for 
terminating, in favor of that same buyer, third party claims to the goods? It 
is this constant interplay between remedies and expectations that calls for a 
definition of buyer status based on remedies. Only when the buyer's 
expectation interest requires, for its satisfaction, an award of a possessory 
remedy, should buyer status be recognized.262 
VI. THE BuvER's PossESsoRY REMEDIES AND THE CouRTs 
The previous section has shown that to effectuate the policy underly-
ing sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(1), the rights of the buyer should tum on 
the existence of a proprietary power over the goods. Only if the buyer can 
compel delivery by the seller do the buyer's expectations justify the 
elimination of certain classes of third party claims to the goods. Although 
courts haw:! not explicitly decided buyer in ordinary course cases on this 
basis, one might reasonably suspect that nothing would change if they 
would hav.~. The factual denominators common to most of the decided 
cases, the buyer's full or substantial prepayment and the seller's insolvency, 
have long been thought to be of potential significance in determining the 
buyer's right to take the goods from the seller.263 In short, the possibility 
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has been 
made or tendered. · 
U.C.C. § 711)(3}. As with specific performance, replevin was never intended to be a 
run·Of·the·mill remedy available to run·Of·the·mill buyers. It too presupposes some impedi· 
ment to the buyer's ability to effect a replacement purchase. 
261. Preventing this anomaly probably explains the presence of § 2~102(1). Neither § 
2·403(2) nor{! 9-307(1) protects the buyer's possessory remedies against intervening claims of 
the seller's unsecured creditors (presumably judicial lien creditors}, but§ 2-402(1) substitutes 
for the good faith purchase doctrine a general right of recovery in the buyer. For the text of 
§ 2-·102(1), Se·~ supra note 239. 
262. The vii~wpoint expressed in the text is equally applicable whene•rer a rule oflaw secures 
the buyer's purchase. For example, U.C.C. § 9-306(2) provides that a di>position of collateral 
pursuant to the secured party's authorization terminates the security interest. One obvious 
issue is the mf aning of the term "disposition." A disposition includes, as the subsection tells us, 
a "sale" or "e1'change,'' but "disposition" should also include the moment a buyer becomes 
entitled to possessory relief, although some courts have found to the contrary. See, e.g., 
Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1978) (failing to give word 
"disposition" any meaning independent of sale or exchange); Mechanics Nat'! Bank v. 
Gaucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 146-49, 386 N.E.2d 1052, 1055-57 (1979) (no "disposition" 
without completed sale or right to payment). 
263. See generally Horack, Insolvency and Specific Perfonnance, 31 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1918); 
Ne\~man, The Effect of Insolvency on Equitable Relief, 13 ST. jOHN's L. REV. 44 (1938); Note, The 
Effat of Prepa)ment Upon the Buyer's Right to the Goods, 37 CoLUM. L. REv. 630 (1937). In recent 
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exists that the presence of this right has been both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a finding of buyer status regardless of the particular defini-
tion a court says it is applying. It is impossible, quite obviously, to test 
accurately this suspicion, but one should examine relevant cases264 in which 
the only issue for decision was the buyer's entitlement to a possessory 
remedy. 255 Do these cases evidence an apparent pattern of recognition of a 
possessory remedy factually coincident to the pattern that convincingly 
suggests itself in the resolution of the buyer cases? An affirmative answer 
would go a long way toward reinforcing the belief that the paramount 
concern of courts in both lines of cases has been the protection of the 
buyer's expectation interest and that that interest commands an equality of 
protection irrespective of whether the buyer seeks a possessory remedy or 
buyer status. 
Consider Proyectos El.ectronicos, S.A. v. Alper.266 Proyectos had ordered 
certain electronics equipment from Ram Manufacturing. The full purchase 
price was paid and the equipment was segregated from the rest of Ram's 
inventory. Unfortunately for Proyectos, Ram's bankruptcy occurred before 
the equipment was shipped.267 Recognizing Proyectos' right to recover the 
goods from the trustee in bankruptcy,268 the district court specifically 
considered the cumulative effect of prepayment and insolvency: 
In this case Proyectos has already paid the debtor the full price for 
the goods. To require Proyectos to cover would require it to pay 
for identical goods a second time and then stand in line with other 
unsecured creditors of the debtor, now bankrupt, with the illusory 
hope that it would get reimbursed for the difference between the 
cost of cover and the original contract price, plus the money 
already paid to debtor. Such a result would not be in keeping with 
the purpose of the Commercial Code to make a non-breaching 
party whole.269 
If it were possible to characterize the opinion in Proyectos as typical, the 
inquiry would be at an end and one would be a bit wiser for having made 
the effort. One would know that a buyer can establish a right to possession, 
years, several commentators have rejected the notion that the drafters of the Code may have 
made available the remedy of specific performance under the "other proper circumstances" 
test of§ 2-716(1) to protect the buyer who has paid in advance. See Gordon, supra note 40, at 
575-76 (viewing this theory as "difficult to sustain"); Speidel, supra note 41, at 286-87 (seeing 
little support for this theory in view of§ 2-716's emphasis on feasibility of replacement rather 
than commitment by the buyer) But see Peters, supra note 256, at 232-33 (suggesting that 
"unique" can be read subjectively to take "into account the resources and commitments of the 
party seeking specific performance."). 
264. In order to maintain a factual harmony with the buyer in ordinary course cases, 
relevant cases for present purposes consist of those involving contracts for single perfor-
mances. Ignored are the othenvise important supply or requirements contract cases. 
265. The remedy most often sought is specific performance. This results from the Code's 
perceived liberalization of the use of specific performance and the inflexibility of the buyer's 
other possessory remedies. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text. 
266. 37 Bankr. 931 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
267. See id. at 932. 
268. Proyectos asserted, and the court agreed, that specific performance was the appropri-
ate remedy. See id. at 933. 
269.Id. 
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at least against an insolvent seller, by showing a substantial prepayment. 
The buyer in ordinary course cases could then be viewed as a reaffirmation 
and extension of this principle, despite the dissimilarity of rhetoric, to 
similar situations distinguishable only as to the identity of the party 
contesting the buyer. 
Although this logic deduces a pervasive judicial bias in favor of the 
prepaying buyer, the deduction is premised on the typicality of Pro-yectos. 
Yet, the majority of courts continue to couch their opinions on possessory 
remedies in the traditional orthodoxy of uniqueness or peculiarity.270 The 
fact remains, however, that prepayment and insolvency are recurrent 
factual themes in most cases in which the buyer is, for some other stated 
reason, awarded possession; and prepayment and insolvency are absent in 
most case:; in which possession is withheld.271 Because this alignment of 
result is not inevitable,272 the proposition that the buyer in ordinary course 
and the right to possession cases are readily explicable as a consequence of 
a preexistent bias is only tentatively offered. Yet, until courts articulate the 
relevancy, if not the determinancy, of prepayment and insolvency, intuition 
suggests that these facts have a part to play in determining buyer status, and 
that the best guess is that they play the leading role. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Code's silence on the temporal issue of buyer in ordinary course 
status illuminates the drafters' failure to foresee that the critical moment of 
270. See, e.g., Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1977) (specific 
performance denied; cotton not unique); Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp. 
13;i4, 1357 (D. Conn. 1984) (specific performance granted; yacht was unique); Abbott v. 
Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 Bankr. 399, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (specific performance 
denied; furniture not unique); Pierce-Odom, Inc. v. Evenson, 632 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1932) (specific performance denied; mobile home not unique); Gay v. Seafarer 
Fiberglass Yachts, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1335, 1335-33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) 
(specific performance appropriate; yacht was unique); Stephan's Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. D & H 
Mach. Consultants, Inc., 65 Ohio App. 2d 197, 201, 417 N.E.2d 579, 583 (1979) (specific 
performance granted; machine was unique); Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or. 387, 395, 498 P.2d 
7•H, 748 (19'!2) (en bane) (specific performance granted; one-half interest in taxi was unique); 
Madariaga v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (specific performance 
granted; Albert's Famous Mexican Hot SaUt:e was unique). 
271. Compvre Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1258-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (specific 
performance denied; no prepayment) and Pierce-Odom, Inc. v. Evenson, 632 S.W.2d 247, 248 
(Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (specific performance denied; insignificant [$100] prepayment) and 
Tower City Grain Co. v. Richman, 232 N.W.2d 61, 66-67 (N.D. 1975) (specific performance 
denied; no prepayment) and Scholl v. Hartzell, 20 Pa. D. & C. 3d 304, 306-09 (1981) (replevin 
denied; insignificant [$100] prepayment) with Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp. 
1354, 1356-57 (D. Conn. 1984) (specific performance granted; significant [$89,614] prepay-
ment) and Tatum v. Richter, 280 Md. 332, 333, 373 A.2d 923, 924 (1977) (replevin granted; 
significant [$15,000] prepayment) and Gay v. Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc. 14 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1335, 1336-38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (specific performance granted; 
significant [$6846.00] prepayment) and Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or. 387, 399-400, 498 P.2d 
74•l, 750 (Hl72) (specific performance granted; $1200 prepayment plus further monthly 
payments) and Madariaga v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (specific 
performance granted; full payment). 
272. See, e.g., Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 Bankr. 399, •103-04 (W.D.N.C. 1983) 
(specific performance denied; full payment). 
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conflict over goods often takes place when goods are still with the seller.273 
The unfortunate result of this lack of foresight is a judicial muddle that 
shows no sign of abating. Reaching divergent conclusions, the many 
opinions in this area are characterized by little judicial creativity and a heavy 
dose of formalistic legal thinking. Overlooked is the common theme that 
underlies both the good faith purchase doctrine and Code's approach to the 
buyer's remedies: protection of the buyer's expectation interest. This theme 
supports the conclusion that deciding when buyer status is attained is no 
different from deciding when to afford the buyer a possessory remedy in a 
case involving a recalcitrant seller. 
Yet, one wonders whether this has not been the instinctive mode of 
analysis being subconsciously applied by most courts. Certainly the courts 
in buyer in ordinary course cases admit a policy preference for buyers. This 
Article suggests that sympathies heavily slanted toward the substantially 
prepaying buyer are also evident in those cases in which the contestant for 
possession is the seller. Indeed, if this is true, then the fact of the buyer's 
prepayment, and perhaps that of the seller's insolvency, take on a practical 
importance that has heretofore been overlooked. Admittedly, courts' 
traditional focus on result leaves the accuracy of this observation open to 
question, but this fact does not mean that it is without value. Even if all one 
has is an impressionistic picture of the relevant factors that underlie the 
decisions, this picture is far better than none at all. 
273. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 41, at 25 n.104 ("Section 9-307 clearly did not 
contemplate the problem of the financing buyer, who leaves the goods in the possession of the 
seller. Rather, the situation envisioned by the draftsmen was that of a person who 'buys' 
inventory and carries it off at the time of sale."). 

